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  Project 
Background This study of Bialla smallholders was undertaken in 2002 as the final 
component of a larger project on smallholder production in Papua 
New Guinea.  Funding was approved by ACIAR in August 1999 for 
a joint Australian National University, Curtin University of 
Technology and Papua New Guinea Oil Palm Research Association 
one-year study to examine the socio-economic constraints on 
smallholder productivity in Hoskins and Popondetta1.  Smallholder 
productivity per hectare is much lower than that of the estate 
plantations, and village oil palm (VOP) productivity is below that of 
the land settlement schemes (LSS) (except in Popondetta). 
 
The primary aim of the original one-year project was to help improve 
smallholder oil palm productivity on LSS and VOP blocks.  The main 
objectives of the original project were to: 
 
• gain an understanding of the socio-economic constraints on 
smallholder production;  
• evaluate the Mama Lus Frut Scheme; 
• develop strategies for more effective extension interventions; 
• make recommendations for change that might result in further 
increases in smallholder productivity, and 
• produce a work manual for extension officers. 
 
The Bialla oil palm scheme was omitted from the original project 
because at the time, Hargy Oil Palm Limited (HOPL) had withdrawn 
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financial support for key industry organisations such as OPIC, and 
their support of the research could not be guaranteed. 
 
At the beginning of 2001 ACIAR extended funding of the project for 
a further 12 months with the main objective of implementing some of 
the recommendations of the study (see Koczberski et al., 2001).  At 
the request of the new HOPL General Manager and the Project 
Manager of OPIC-Bialla, the project objectives were amended to 






In consultation with senior management of OPIC-Bialla and HOPL, 
it was agreed that the research objectives would be similar to the 
1999/2000 study conducted among Hoskins and Popondetta 
smallholders.  Thus the two main objectives of the study were to: 
 
• gain an understanding of the socio-economic constraints on 
smallholder production; and 
• make recommendations for change that might result in 
increased smallholder productivity. 
 
Fieldwork was conducted over a five-week period in May/June 2002 
by the authors and two OPRA research assistants (Norma Konimor 
and Pauline Hore).  The focus of fieldwork and data collection was 
smallholders.  Drawing principally on interviews, meetings and 
surveys with smallholders, the study examined the factors operating at 
the household level that influence oil palm production.  We focused on 
the household in our analysis because it is at the household level 







 Structure of 
the Report  This report identifies some of the main constraints on smallholder 
production in the Bialla scheme and recommends ways to increase 
smallholder productivity.  The structure and approach of this report 
follows closely our earlier study of Hoskins and Popondetta 
smallholders carried out in 2001 (Koczberski et al., 2001).  This is to 
allow some level of comparison between the different smallholder 
schemes.  However, due to the more limited time available for 
fieldwork in the Bialla area, this report lacks the breadth of analysis 
conducted in the earlier Hoskins-Popondetta smallholder study. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a background to the Bialla oil palm scheme and 
Chapter 3 discusses the research design and methods employed in 
this study.  Chapter 4 describes the main livelihood strategies 
pursued by Bialla smallholders.  Bialla smallholders, like Hoskins 
and Popondetta smallholders, are pursuing a range of livelihood 
strategies that are influenced by demographic factors, resource 
access, economic and social pressures and customary obligations.  
Sometimes these livelihood strategies facilitate smallholder 
productivity while at other times they disrupt oil palm production.  In 
Chapter 5 the discussion moves to consider the range of smallholder 
household types and how these shape smallholder production 
strategies through their influence on the supply of labour for block 
maintenance and oil palm harvesting.  It is argued here that certain 
factors such as payment uncertainty for labour and social conflict act 
to constrain the supply of labour which results in much under-utilised 
labour and hence lost production and lower productivity. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses broader agronomic and farm management 
practices affecting smallholder productivity such as the low 
propensity to replant on the older subdivisions, the reluctance of 
smallholders to purchase fertiliser, and the factors influencing 
smallholder motivation and commitment to oil palm. Finally, 
 3
 
Chapter 7 draws out the main conclusions of the study and makes 
some recommendations to improve smallholder productivity and 
incomes. 
 
While the report is largely concerned with the Bialla scheme (with 
comparisons with other oil palm regions of PNG), many sections of 
the report are relevant to the other oil palm project areas in PNG.  For 
example, household labour issues and under-harvesting discussed in 
Chapter 5, and the sections in Chapter 6 on smallholder fertiliser use, 
replanting, and transport schedules and roads have relevance for the 
broader industry in PNG.  Further, the recommendations made in 
Chapter 7 provide possible interventions and ideas for increasing 
smallholder production in other schemes where household labour 
issues, poor replanting rates, low fertiliser use and under-harvesting 





1. Because of the requirement to include both LSS and VOP 
smallholders in the research, fieldwork was limited to the 
Hoskins and Popondetta oil palm projects. New Ireland and 
Milne Bay do not have oil palm LSSs and were therefore 









TBialla Scheme he Bialla oil palm project occupies 18,182 hectares of the central 
and east Nakanai areas of West New Britain, with 12,182 hectares 
under smallholder oil palm cultivation (OPIC data, n.d.).  Oil palm 
extends over the volcanic slopes and the alluvial plains between the 
Nakanai mountain ranges and the Bismarck Sea.  Natural disasters 
such as flooding, volcanic activity and extended dry periods have 
adversely affected production in recent years.  To the east, the project 
borders the Pomio district of East New Britain and to the west 
adjoins the Hoskins oil palm project (Figure 2.1).  Total oil palm 
production for 2002 was 236,366 tonnes, 54% of which was 
produced by smallholders. 
 
The Bialla project was established in 1972 following a joint 
agreement between the government and a Japanese milling company.  
A disagreement between the government and the company delayed 
the commencement of the project, and in 1977 a new agreement was 
signed with SIPEF (Belgium) and Warrens (United Kingdom) 
(Christensen 1986).  A joint government and SIPEF-Warrens venture 
company, Hargy Oil Palms Ltd (HOPL) was formed and the 
company partners developed a nucleus estate of oil palm and a 
processing mill.  The government opened alienated land adjacent to 
the estate for smallholders to plant oil palm and supply fruit to the 
company mill.  In 2002 the government began negotiations to sell its 
shares in Hargy Oil Palms Ltd.  This sale was delayed due to a 





Figure 2.1. Oil palm regions in Papua New Guinea. 
 
The Bialla project area, which includes Central Nakanai, was 
originally formed to provide fruit to the Hargy mill.  However, in 
1995 New Britain Palm Oil Limited (NBPOL) began buying fruit 
from Central Nakanai smallholders.  In 2002 NBPOL collected 
37,121 tonnes from Central Nakanai growers which accounted for 
22% of total smallholder production in the Bialla scheme. 
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The three key stakeholders in the Bialla project are the nucleus estate 
company (HOPL), smallholders and the Oil Palm Industry 
Corporation (OPIC)1. 
 Hargy Oil 
Palm Ltd HOPL has a total of 5,110 mature hectares in estate production, 
which in 2002 produced 104,075 tonnes or 20.36 tonnes/hectare. 
 
Over the last decade the company made substantial investments in 
the Bialla project including: 
 
• expanding plantings at Navo plantations to a total of 3,853 
hectares; 
• replanting over 2,100 hectares of the original Hargy plantation; 
• refurbishing and improving the capacity of the Bialla mill to 
45Mt-FFB/hr; and 
• constructing a new mill at Navo with a processing capacity of 
30Mt-FFB/hr (upgradeable to 45 Mt-FFB/hr). 
 
The Navo mill was commissioned in late October 2002.  The 
upgrading of the original mill together with the new mill at Navo will 
overcome the inadequate milling capacity that has been a constraint 
on estate and smallholder production over the last decade. 
 
The plantation yields of 20.36 tonnes per hectare in 2002 reflect the 
high proportion of young palms in the estates.  HOPL undertook an 
extensive replanting program between 1994 and 2001 (most of which 
was carried out in 1999), and has recently expanded its Navo 
plantation. 
 
Over the last five years estate production has steadily increased as 
palms mature.  Table 2.1 shows estate, smallholder and community 
estate production for the period 1997 to 2002. 
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Table 2.1.  Total FFB production (tonnes) for the Bialla project area  










1997 64,100 59,582 885 124,567 
1998 66,276 74,648 739 141,663 
1999 61,983 98,964 767 161,714 
2000 82,495 117,260 2,470 202,225 
2001 92,747 118,080 3,708 214,535 
2002 104,075 127, 319 4,972 236,366 
(Data supplied by HOPL) 
*  Tonnage for fruit processed at the Hargy Mill.  See Table 2.3 for total smallholder production for the 
Bialla scheme.  
** Community estates are holdings of oil palm over 20 hectares which are managed by customary land 
owners. 
 
With the restrictions and difficulties of alienating further land for 
estate development, HOPL, since the late 1990s, has encouraged 
local landowners to form incorporated business groups or incorporated 
landowning groups (ILGs) to develop and manage large holdings of 
oil palm, ranging in size from 20 ha to over 600 ha.  Most are 
developed on portions of unused state land.  The scheme, known as the 
Community Oil Palm Estate Development (COPED) model2, emerged 
at around the same time as the Navo mill was being planned.  The 
main feature of the COPED model is that the ‘community’ develops 
and manages their own oil palm estate with technical and credit 
support provided by the company.  Presently, there are 25 community 
estates, with three in production.  Over the last five years production 
has been increasing and in 2002 total COPED production reached 
4,972 tonnes (Table 2.1).  The largest community estate is Gilo with 
a total area of 639 hectares, 313 hectares of which have been 
planted. In 2002 the Gilo estate yield was 13 tonnes/hectare, which 
was lower than the smallholder yield of 13.6 tonnes/hectare for the 
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same year.  Problems with transporting the crop to the mill were the 
main reason for the low yields. 
 
The community estates provide an alternative model to the lease, 
lease-back model adopted by other oil palm companies in PNG, 
whereby the ILG sub-leases registered customary land to the 
company on a 20 or 40 year lease.  In the lease, lease-back model the 
milling company manages the estate, and the landowning group 
receives annual land rental fees and monthly royalty payments of 
10% of the farmgate price of the harvested oil palm.  Under the 
COPED model, the management and control of the estate remain 
with the landowning group and the company buys directly from 
landowners.  
 
Smallholders’ contribution to total FFB processed at the HOPL mill 
is high, and in most years has exceeded 50% of the total FFB 
processed by the company mill (Table 2.2).  The Bialla mill 
processes the highest ratio of smallholder to company fruit in PNG, 
and in 2002 smallholders contributed 56% to total HOPL production.  
Thus, the smallholder sector is much more important for HOPL’s 





Table 2.2.  Bialla Smallholder Production (tonnes) as a share of total HOPL 
production from 1997 to 2001. 




SHARE OF TOTAL 
HOPL 
PRODUCTION (%) 
1997 124,567 60,467 48.5 
1998 141,663 75,387 53.2 
1999 161,714 99,731 61.7 
2000 202,225 119,730 59.2 
2001 214,535 121,788 56.8 
2002 236,366 127,319 53.8 
(Data supplied by HOPL ) 
* Figures based on smallholder fruit sold to HOPL. 
 
The smallholder proportion would be higher if some Bialla 
smallholder fruit was not collected and processed by NBPOL’s 
Kapiura mill (Table 2.3).  Over the last five years, approximately 
thirty-two per cent of the total smallholder fruit from the Bialla 
scheme has been processed by NBPOL. 
 
Table 2.3.  Total FFB (tonnes) sold to NBPOL and HOPL by Bialla smallholders 
from 1997 to 2002. 




1997 38,707 60,467 99,174 
1998 41,280 75,387 116,667 
1999 34,060 99,731 133,791 
2000 31,629 119,730 151,359 
2001 37,100 121,788 158,888 
2002 37,922 127,319 165,241 
(Data supplied by HOPL and OPIC- Bialla) 
 
Presently, HOPL provides limited credit facilities to smallholders for 
poisoning, seedlings, tools and fertiliser. To overcome the lack of 
credit facilities available to smallholders, OPIC has established a
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new ‘growers fund’ financed by smallholder contributions (see 
below).  This assists smallholders to purchase tools from the 
company or local tradestores. 
 
The company’s relationship with smallholders has been strained in 
recent years and can be attributed to transport and fruit collection 
related problems, replanting delays (see Chapter 6), limited milling 
capacity, credit deduction mishaps, and disputes with NBPOL over 
fruit collection.  A change of HOPL management in January 2002 
has resulted in many of these problems now being addressed.  
 
Smallholder production is locatSmallholders  ed on Land Settlement Schemes 
(LSS) (state leased land) and on Village Oil Palm schemes (VOPs), 
and extends over 12,182 hectares. In 2002, Bialla smallholders 
produced 165,241 tonnes of fruit with an average yield per hectare of 
13.6 tonnes.This report identifies some of the main constraints on 
smallholder. 
 
The land settlement scheme at Bialla is the second oldest oil palm 
scheme in PNG.  It formed part of the colonial administration’s land 
settlement policies of the 1950s and 1960s whereby the government 
obtained large tracts of land along the north coast of New Britain for 
agricultural and economic development (Hulme 1984).  Much of this 
land was considered suitable for the development of oil palm.  The 
first smallholder LSS in the province was developed at nearby 
Hoskins in 1968 and its perceived success led the administration to 
establish similar oil palm nucleus estate-smallholder schemes at 
Bialla and Popondetta (Hulme 1984). 
 
The Bialla LSS followed that of the Hoskins scheme.  Leaseholders 
acquired 99-year leases over land holdings of approximately 6.0-6.5 
hectares in size.  It was expected that 4 hectares would be planted to 
oil palm, and the remaining area reserved for food gardens.  
Leaseholders were provided with loans from the Papua New Guinea 
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Development Bank (PNGDB) for housing, oil palm seedlings, tools, 
land rent and to cover living expenses while waiting for the first 
harvest (Jonas 1972; Hulme 1984).  Settlement occurred on the 
newly developed subdivisions at Wilelo, Tiaru and Balima, and on 
redeveloped cocoa/coconut blocks at Sale, Sege, Malasi, Uasilau and 
Selanga.  Settler selection on the original subdivisions followed that 
of the Hoskins scheme with blocks publicly advertised and priority 
given to applicants from land-short areas of Papua New Guinea.  The 
majority of oil palm blocks on the redeveloped cocoa/coconut 
subdivisions were occupied by local landowners. 
 
By 1980 attention had turned to establishing VOP holdings and 
plantings steadily increased throughout the decade.  By 1986, 244 
VOP blocks had been established (OPIC data).  The numbers of LSS 
and VOP smallholder blocks have increased substantially over the 
last two decades and there are now 2,052 LSS and 1,409 VOP blocks 
(Table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.4.  Numbers and areas of LSS and VOP blocks in the Bialla 
scheme in 2002. 
 
SMALLHOLDER NUMBER OF 
BLOCKS 
HECTARES 
LSS 2,194 9,164 
VOP 1,290 3,018 
TOTAL 3,484 12,182 
(Data supplied by OPIC-Bialla) 
 
An ADB loan in 1986 funded a major expansion of LSS and VOP 
blocks during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Also, in the early 
1990s, two new LSS subdivisions, Soi and Kabaiya, were opened for 




Settler selection for Soi and Kabaiya differed from earlier LSSs, with 
priority given to East and West New Britain applicants and the sons 
of the original oil palm settlers born in West New Britain.  The latter 
has meant that Soi and Kabaiya have strong ties with the Hoskins 
scheme and the older LSS subdivisions in the Bialla scheme.  Soi and 
Kabaiya visibly differ from the original LSS schemes: physically 
(better housing and water supplies); demographically (younger and 
smaller households); and, better farm management practices.  
Smallholder yields are consistently higher at Soi and Kabaiya than 
the older LSS subdivisions (A. Vegoa, pers. comm.). 
 
With the opening up of the Soi and Kabaiya subdivisions and the 
construction of the Navo mill nearby, there has been renewed interest 
in oil palm by local landowners with both VOP and community 
estate plantings expanding.  For the Bialla scheme as a whole, there 
is potential for a further 13,000 hectares of smallholder oil palm to be 
developed (A. Vegoa, pers. comm.).  This will be through expansion 
and infill of VOP areas (mainly in the Central and East Nakanai 
areas) and Third Phase planting on existing LSS blocks (Vegoa 
2002). 
 
Despite similar growing conditions at Bialla and Hoskins, Bialla 
smallholders have lower yields than Hoskins smallholders but 
favourable yields when compared with other smallholder oil palm 
schemes.  Over the next five years, OPIC-Bialla aims to increase 
smallholder yields to 20 tonnes/hectare.  Thus, increasing 
smallholder production and productivity is a major aim of the 
company and OPIC. 
 
Agricultural extension services to smallholders were initially under 
the management of the Department of Agriculture and Livestock 
(DAL).  In 1992, as part of the government’s corporatisation and 




government agency.  OPIC is financed by a smallholder crop levy of 
K3.50/tonne which is matched by the oil palm companies.  
International aid funding also provides significant financial support 
for the organisation. 
 
The central role of OPIC is to provide extension services to 
smallholders and to: 
 
•  increase smallholder productivity; 
•  promote improved farm management techniques; 
•  provide advice and education regarding oil palm production 
methods; 
•  enhance the well-being of smallholders. 
 
OPIC is also responsible for liaising with government, oil palm 
companies, grower representatives and other organisations involved 
in the industry.  A Local Planning Committee (LPC) comprising 
representatives from OPIC, HOPL, the Bialla Oil Palm Growers 
Association, OPRA and the Rural Development Bank meets monthly 
to discuss smallholder and OPIC issues and policies. 
 
The capacity of OPIC-Bialla to provide effective extension services 
to smallholders was curtailed over the five years to mid 2002 due to 
severe financial constraints.  From 1997 to May 2002 HOPL did not 
match the K3.50 OPIC levy paid by smallholders (paid by all the 
other milling companies operating in PNG).  For instance, in 2000, 
OPIC’s operational expenses were K871,580; yet the organisation 
raised only K660,570 from smallholder levies and NBPOL’s 
contribution (ADS [PNG], 2001).  Funding shortfalls resulted in 
OPIC reducing its staff to 13 extension officers, which is 
approximately 50% below expected staffing levels.  In 2002 the staff 
to smallholder ratio was 1:268 (A. Vegoa, pers. comm.).  While the 
extension officer to smallholder ratio has been decreasing at all oil 
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palm projects in PNG, OPIC-Bialla has been in a particularly 
difficult situation due to the non-payment of the OPIC levy by 
HOPL.  Following the appointment of a new HOPL General 
Manager in January 2002, payment of the OPIC levy by the company 
was renewed in June 2002, and the relationship between the 
company and OPIC has improved considerably.  Both organisations 
are now working together to improve the quality and effectiveness of 
OPIC extension services. 
 
A further factor limiting the effectiveness of OPIC is the lack of 
provincial government funds allocated to roads and social 
infrastructure in Bialla.  Roads and social services such as health 
facilities have deteriorated over the last five years (S. Kamis, pers. 
comm.). 
 
Over the past few years OPIC has adopted several initiatives to 
improve smallholder productivity.  The most significant is the 
‘Mama Loose Fruit’ Scheme which began in 1998; by the end of 
2002 there were 2,125 women registered in the scheme.  In 2001, 
23,974 tonnes of loose fruit were harvested, representing 
approximately 15% of total production. 
 
In 2002 a new ‘growers trust fund’ was established by OPIC-Bialla.  
The fund is financed by a smallholder levy of K1 per tonne and is 
held in a trust account managed by OPIC and HOPL.  The fund is 
administered by a board made up of smallholder representatives and 
OPIC.  HOPL provides some accounting assistance.  At August 2002 
there was K240,000 in the fund.  The fund is a strategy by OPIC to 
reduce smallholder debt with the company through accumulating 
smallholder funds in a managed trust fund to be made available for 
farm management needs.  The current priority of the fund is to 
finance tools and sexava treatment.  In the future, as funds 
accumulate, money may be available for fertiliser, block 
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development and replanting.  The scheme appears popular with 
smallholders and some would like to see the levy raised.  It is 
possible that the levy may increase in the near future if oil palm 





1. Although NBPOL buys fruit from Central Nakanai growers it is 
not included here as a key stakeholder in the Bialla project. 
 
2. A forthcoming report by the authors discusses oil palm mini-









Objectives The main objectives of the Bialla study were to: 
• gain an understanding of the socio-economic constraints on 
smallholder production; and 
•  make recommendations for change that might result in 






The research, where possible, adopted the methodology employed in 
the earlier Hoskins and Popondetta study so that comparisons could 
be made between study sites.  Like the Hoskins and Popondetta 
research, fieldwork at Bialla began with a workshop with OPIC 
extension officers to draw on their knowledge and understanding of 
the main factors influencing smallholder production.  The main 
socio-agronomic issues identified by extension officers are presented 
in Table 3.1, and these formed the basis of discussion and helped 
formulate the research design. 
 
The workshop also allowed us to assess the similarities and 
differences amongst the Bialla, Hoskins and Popondetta schemes.  
This information was necessary to help structure the research design 
and questions, and to locate Bialla smallholder issues and production 
constraints into the wider context of smallholder production in PNG.  
 
The workshop discussion raised issues similar to those identified by 
OPIC officers at Hoskins and Popondetta (Appendices 1 and 2).  The 
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key variables identified in all three oil palm schemes as affecting 





SOCIO-AGRONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING 
SMALLHOLDER PRODUCTION COMMON TO THE 
BIALLA, HOSKINS AND POPONDETTA SCHEMES. 
(IDENTIFIED BY OPIC EXTENTION OFFICERS)  
 
 
• Physical factors 
• Agronomic and farm management practices. 
• Intra-household relations and decision-making. 
• Household income distribution 
• Time and cash management skills 
• Tenure security 
• Economic necessity to harvest 
• Level of interest in oil palm harvesting 
• Company management 
 
 
Bialla extension officers emphasised the following four important 
issues.  First, smallholders frequently shift between high and low 
production through time depending on health status, tenure disputes, 
household or inter-block conflicts and/or other socio-cultural factors 

















.  Factors identified by OPIC officers to explain high and low production among Bialla smallholders 
HIGH PRODUCTION LOW PRODUCTION 
L FEATURES  Good soils. 
Good terrain conditions and drainage. 
Poor soils (especially a problem when combined with lack of fertilizer application) 
Poor terrain conditions and poor drainage. 
 
MIC AND FARM MANAGEMENT 
ES 
Regular harvesting 
Regular and correct use of fertiliser. 
Well maintained tools regularly available for harvesting. 
Well maintained block. 
Readily listens to extension advice. 
Poison and replants when oil palm is at appropriate age 
Irregular and partial harvesting. 
Fertiliser use poor or irregular. 
Harvesting tools often unavailable for harvesting or broken and not repaired promptly. 
Poor block maintenance. 
Farmer rarely follows extension advice 
Resists poisoning and replanting block.  
Old palms on block.  Grower tends to harvest only the younger and shorter palms. 
 
 CHARACTERISTICS Adequate supply of labour.  
Health problems rarely disrupt family labour supply. 
Co-operation of all family members in production. 
 
Labour shortages due to illness, age or family disputes 




Family unity and cohesiveness.   Family conflict.
DISTRIBUTION All the family benefits from income earned on block.   
Fair distribution of income.  
Fair allocation of harvest and income rounds in rotation production 
strategy. 
Caretaker blocks – remuneration for labour is reasonable and share of 
block income fair. 
Reluctance to share income.  One person controls the money and thus little incentive for other 
family members to harvest. 
Family disputes over the distribution of the income 
Unfair allocation of harvest and income rounds in rotation production system leading to dispute
Caretaker blocks – remuneration for labour poor and share of block income unfair. 
D CASH MANAGEMENT SKILLS Good cash management. 
Community type distractions limited. 
Good time management.  Limited demands on their time from 
customary obligations. 
 
Poor cash management. 
More time spent in the village than working on the block.  Labour diverted to gardening or 
customary obligations. 
 
SECURITY Land tenure secure. 
No family disputes over title of block. 
Block inheritance disputes within the family acts as a disincentive as ownership uncertain. 
Land ownership disputes on CLUA blocks, tenure insecure. 
Disputes over ownership on caretaker blocks can reduce production 
 
MENT TO OIL PALM Farmer lives permanently on the block. Farmer lives off-block (e.g. in the village) and therefore not present to receive OPIC advice or p
up toksave. 
Commitment limited due to tenure insecurity. 
IC MOTIVATION Fall in oil palm prices has only limited impact on production. 
Customary obligations may increase production in the short-term 
Fall in oil palm prices acts as disincentive.  Some stop harvesting and maintaining the block. 
 
 COMPANY Good Management 
Sufficient milling capacity 
Smallholder support good – e.g. tool supply, fertilizer, credit 
Poor Management 
Limited milling capacity 
Smallholder support limted. 
UCTURE AND TRANSPORT Good roads 
Regular and reliable harvest pick-ups 
Poor roads. 
Irregular and unreliable harvest pick-ups 
Monthly pick-ups restricts production 
Source: data collected from workshop with OPIC officers at Bialla, 15th 
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 Second, intra-household factors are central to understanding block 
productivity.  For example, family cohesion, how labour and 
payment of labour are organised within and between households on a 
block, household decision-making processes and gender relations all 
affect the availability and utilisation of labour for oil palm 
production.   
 
Third, poor cash and time management can be major impediments to 
higher production.  Poor cash management affects production 
through causing conflicts over income distribution within and 
between households, acts as a disincentive to the purchase of farm 
inputs such as fertiliser and tools, and can result in high debt levels 
on blocks.  Finally, ethnic tensions can have short and long-term 
impacts on production.  At Bialla, long-standing tensions between 
Highlanders and Sepiks occasionally erupt in violence to cause 
periodic disruption of oil palm production.  Also, like at Hoskins and 
Popondetta, conflicts between leaseholders and customary 
landowners at Bialla can serve as disincentives to financial and 
labour investments in oil palm production. 
 
The workshop discussions with OPIC officers highlighted the 
following research questions requiring further investigation: 
 
*In what ways do intra-household factors affect labour 
utilisation in oil palm production? 
*Do the types of smallholder production units identified 
at Hoskins and Popondetta also apply at Bialla and, if 
so, how do they impact on oil palm production? 
*How do time and cash management issues affect oil 
palm production?  
*Are land tenure problems affecting smallholder 
production? 
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Other factors identified by OPIC officers to explain low smallholder 
production at Bialla included: 
 
•  Delayed replanting.  Palms more than 20 years old (past the age 
when they should be replanted) tend to be partially harvested or 
abandoned by growers. 
•  The institutional context of the Bialla Scheme.  Here reference 
was made to the management capacity of the milling company 
and the effectiveness of extension services. 
•  Infrastructure and transport problems.  Poor roads and on-going 
fruit transport problems were identified as affecting smallholder 
production and commitment to oil palm. 
 
The study therefore also addressed the following research questions. 
 
*What factors explain the poor replanting rates by 
smallholders? 
*Are constraints on credit facilities limiting smallholder 
productivity? 
*What is the nature of the relationship between 
smallholders and the milling company? 
 
The above research questions were incorporated into our interviews 




Design In the initial stages of fieldwork OPIC officers accompanied the 
research team to the small holder blocks to help the team establish 
links with smallholders and create an awareness among smallholders 
of the study.  OPIC also provided transport support throughout the 
fieldwork period and assisted with arranging community meetings.  
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All three OPIC Divisions were included in the study, with most of 
the qualitative data collected from Divisions 2 and 3.  Fieldwork was 
concentrated in the latter Divisions for two reasons.  First, most 
smallholders in Division 1 sell their fruit to NBPOL, and the 
research was more concerned with those smallholders selling fruit to 
the Bialla milling company – Hargy Oil Palms.  Second, logistical 
and time constraints made it impossible to spend equal periods in all 
three divisions. 
 
The research employed a multi-method approach.  This was 
considered most appropriate because the study examined the 
interaction and links between the various social, economic, 
demographic and institutional factors affecting smallholder 
production.  Hence, a combination of methods involving semi-
structured interviews, household case studies, questionnaire surveys 
and community group discussions were employed.  Secondary data 
sources were also used. 
 
Further, a mix of qualitative and quantitative techniques was 
considered preferable to relying solely on a standardised 
questionnaire where larger numbers of people are surveyed.  The 
latter technique assumes that the researchers already have a detailed 
understanding of the economic and social situations in the sample 
population.  Where little is known about the everyday lives of a 
population, qualitative assessments together with formal surveys 
enable the researcher to develop a more accurate and in-depth 
picture of the situation of the study population. 
 
Key stakeholder groups that participated in the research included: 
 
1. Smallholders (men and women). 
2. HOPL. 
3. OPIC. 
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4. Smallholder representative groups, such as the Bialla Oil Palm 




Survey Data collection began with a smallholder socio-economic and farm 
management survey of 100 growers, proportionally representative 
of the VOP and LSS smallholders in the Bialla scheme (25 VOP 
and 75 LSS blocks).  Smallholders were randomly selected from 
Divisions 1, 2 and 3. 
 
The survey design was based on the growers’ survey conducted in 
Hoskins and Popondetta in 2000-2001 (Koczberski et al., 2001) to 
allow comparisons to be made between all three schemes.  The 
survey gathered information on: 
 
o Planting details (area and year planted). 
o Ownership status (original leaseholder, deceased 
estate, caretaker). 
o Population (number of individuals and families 
living on block). 
o Range of income sources. 
o Labour supply. 
o Farm management and agronomic practices. 
 
Interviews The second primary source of data was formal and semi-formal 
interviews, mainly with smallholders.  The majority of the semi-
formal interviews were conducted with smallholders selected for the 
socio-economic and farm management survey.  On completing this 
survey, smallholders were encouraged to express their own views on 
oil palm production and productivity and social issues on their 
blocks.  This approach sought insights into what smallholders 
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themselves felt were the important everyday issues affecting 
production and/or their lives.  It also allowed people to tell their own 
‘stori’ and uncovered areas that were significant to the needs and 
interests of smallholders.  Some surveyed smallholders were 
interviewed at a later date.  Other smallholders who were not part of 
the survey approached the research team or OPIC to be interviewed 
and where possible they were also interviewed. These semi-formal 
interviews were distinct from, but complementary to the smallholder 
surveys.  The interviews provided in-depth qualitative information on 
the questions in the smallholder survey relating to:  
 
•  household labour and income decision-making; 
•  factors influencing household and family members’ participation 
in oil palm production; 
•  additional and/or competing labour and income demands; 
•  levels of household cohesion and cooperation; 
•  constraints on oil palm production; 
•  impacts and perceptions of agricultural extension and company 
initiatives. 
 
Formal interviews with smallholders were conducted towards the end 
of the fieldwork period and were used to cross-check and clarify 
information emerging from the surveys and semi-formal interviews.  
We randomly selected 33 smallholder households in Wilelo and 
Balima to follow-up specific research questions relating to the 
relationship between replanting and under-harvesting, and at Soi and 
Kabaiya 34 smallholders were randomly selected to gather further 
information on specific questions relating to labour shortages and 
under-harvesting.  Of the latter, only 24 interviews took place due to 
vehicle breakdowns. 
 
In all interviews the research team was careful to include women in 
the discussions.  It should be noted that due to time constraints most 
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smallholder interviews were ‘one-off’ interviews and not ‘repeat’ 
interviews.  Repeat visits allow a level of trust and rapport to develop 
thereby providing more reliable and detailed information. 
 
Interviews were also conducted with OPIC-Bialla senior managers 
and extension officers, senior management in HOPL, including the 
smallholder officer, and the manager of the Rural Development Bank 
in Bialla.  These interviews provided information on corporate 
policies and management issues relating to smallholders, and helped 





Four community meetings were held with smallholders (at 
Matililiu VOP, Wilelo LSS and two meetings at Tiaru LSS).  
Numbers present varied from four to twelve smallholders, with 
males outnumbering female participants.  The purpose of the 
meetings was to inform smallholders of the aims of the study and 
solicit their views on what they identified as the key factors 
affecting smallholder production and productivity on their blocks 
and subdivisions.  The meetings also provided an opportunity to 





Smallholder data-bases held by OPIC and HOPL provided data on 
block production, planting details and debt levels.  Reports and 
other studies on the Bialla scheme were also consulted. 





1. Customary obligations do not necessarily lead to lower 
productivity.  For some growers, customary obligations drive 
their involvement in oil palm production, so that, for example, 
oil palm production can increase when cash is required for 
customary purposes. 









Introduction The economic, social and demographic characteristics of smallholder 
oil palm households are becoming more diverse through time, and 
many smallholders are now pursuing non-oil palm income sources 
both on and off-block. We use the term livelihood strategies to 
describe the diverse economic, household and customary activities in 
which Bialla smallholders are involved.  Livelihood strategies can be 
defined as the range of activities adopted and choices made by 
smallholders in pursuit of household economic and social security 
(DFID 1999).  Oil palm production is one of several livelihood 
strategies that smallholders employ to meet their economic and social 
needs in a changing socio-economic and demographic environment. 
 
This chapter outlines the main livelihood strategies pursued by Bialla 
smallholders.  By focusing on livelihood strategies the chapter 
reveals the social and economic complexity of smallholder blocks 
today.  This has implications for extension services and for 
formulating appropriate smallholder interventions.  Also, an analysis 
of social and non-oil palm economic activities that draw on 
smallholder labour and time helps explain variations in smallholder 
productivity and commitment to oil palm production. 
 
 Livelihood 
Strategies The main activities in which Bialla smallholders are engaged 
include: 
•  commodity production, in addition to oil palm; 
•  small business enterprises; 
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• off-farm employment; 
• informal marketing; 
• subsistence production (for household consumption and for sale 
at local markets); and 
• customary activities. 
 
For some farmers, the term oil palm smallholder is not entirely 
appropriate because oil palm production is only a minor part of their 
lives.  For example, for some VOP smallholders, oil palm harvesting 
may be limited to periods when cash demands are unusually high such 
as when school fees are due, when a relative requires financial 
assistance, or a customary payment like a brideprice must be made. 
 
There is an average of 2.49 non-oil palm income sources per LSS 
block and 3.32 per VOP block at Bialla.  The higher economic 
diversification of VOP blocks is partly explained by customary 
landowners’ greater access to land (see below).  The main components 
of livelihood strategies of Bialla smallholders are outlined below. 
 
Commodity Production 
Like Hoskins and Popondetta smallholders, Bialla smallholders have 
holdings of cash crops other than oil palm (Table 4.1).  Bialla VOP 
smallholders are more likely than LSS smallholders to have other 
cash crops such as cocoa and coconuts (Table 4.1).  Sixty-four per 
cent of VOP smallholders have access to at least one non-oil palm 
cash crop, and 14% have two or more types of cash crops in addition 
to oil palm.  This reflects VOP smallholders’ greater access to land, 
their more recent move into oil palm production, and their response 
to the unstable market conditions of commodity tree crops.  Many 
smallholders have retained their original holdings of cocoa and 
coconuts by planting oil palm on land that was not previously used 
for export cash crops. 
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Table 4.1.  Percentages of LSS and VOP blockholders with export cash crops 
other than oil palm. 
 
OIL PALM SCHEME COCOA  COPRA COFFEE VANILLA RUBBER 
  
  % % % % % 
BIALLA LSS 1 4 0 5 0 
   VOP 43 14 4 7 0 
HOSKINS VSS 24 10 0 2 0 
  VOP 62 66 2 10 0 
POPONDETTA LSS 2 0 4 0 0 
  VOP 32 0 25 0 7 
(Source: Smallholder Surveys n=300) 
 
VOP smallholders view cash crop diversity as a form of income 
security against fluctuating commodity prices, and they will adjust 
their labour and investment inputs into different cash crops according 
to relative prices.  For example, at the time of fieldwork when the 
price of oil palm was relatively high (K130-K140), many VOP 
smallholders had withdrawn from copra production because of the 
depressed copra price, and were relying mostly on oil palm income.  
The prolonged period of low copra prices led some villagers to take up 
oil palm production in an attempt to restore their income levels 
and income security. 
 
With limited access to land, LSS smallholders are restricted to 
planting only one commodity tree crop – oil palm.  The few LSS 
smallholders (Table 4.1) with cocoa and coconut holdings are local 
landowners with access to customary land.  Vanilla, which requires 
only a small area of land, is becoming popular among LSS 
smallholders (5.3% of LSS blocks had planted vanilla by June 2002, 
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and this proportion is expected to increase).  Apart from providing an 
additional income source, vanilla is attractive to smallholders 
because it can be cultivated on hilly areas unsuitable for oil palm and 
requires less labour than oil palm.  Further, because it does not 
require much land, it need not undermine food production on the 
third phase at the rear of the block.  One elderly grower at Balima 
LSS planted 100 vanilla vines because it enabled him to withdraw 
from the physically demanding work of oil palm production and 
‘hand-over’ the management and harvesting of oil palm to his eldest 
son. 
 
Other Income Sources 
Other non-oil palm incomes pursued by smallholders to maintain 
household income security and social well-being are shown in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2.  Small businesses are popular with smallholders, 
the most common being poultry raising, tradestores and kerosene 
sales.  Poultry businesses are common at both Hoskins and Bialla 
because they can be established relatively easily and there is a ready 
market for live chickens.  Fresh chickens are often cooked as a form 
of in-kind payment of harvesting labour or as part payment for hired 
labour.  If the poultry business owner can limit the proportion of 
sales on credit, then there is potential for profitable returns.  One 
smallholder in Wilelo subdivision purchased his block in October 
2000 for K9,500.  The capital was raised over three years from his 
poultry business1.  
 
Tradestores and kerosene sales are also popular, especially among 
LSS smallholders, and are more common among Bialla smallholders 
than at Hoskins.  This may be due to fewer large stores in Bialla 
township than at Kimbe, and the more limited transport between the 
land settlement subdivisions and town, particularly in the more 
isolated subdivisions in Division 3.  It is also possible that factors 
like the increased uncertainty of oil palm income at Bialla arising 
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from poor roads and irregular fruit pickups has induced some 
growers to diversify their income sources to a greater extent than 
those at Hoskins. 
 
Betel nut sales are expanding and are an important income source for 
LSS and VOP smallholders.  Although betel nut has been long 
established as an item for sale at local markets, the nature of betel nut 






























Figure 4.1. Non oil palm income sources for LSS smallholders 



































Figure 4.2.  Non oil-palm income sources for VOP smallholders 
 
 
People now view betel nut as another cash crop and have established 
smallholdings for bulk wholesaling.  Rather than marketing the crop 
at the local market, some smallholders are selling in bulk to buyers 
who market the crop within the province or export it to other 
provinces.  Many of the buyers on-selling the crop at local markets 
reside in the informal urban settlements at Kimbe and Bialla and do 
not have land of their own.  A growing wholesale market in betel nut 
has thus induced some smallholders to plant large numbers of betel 
nut palms.  In 2002, 17% of smallholder households in Bialla 
reported betel nut sales as their second or third most important 
income source.  The increased cultivation and trading of betel nut is 
an example of how smallholders adjust their labour and land use 









Plate 4.1. Betel nut sales are a common source of income for women. 
 
Off-farm employment 
Some members of smallholder families seek full-time or part-time 
off-block employment to supplement household incomes (Figures 4.1 
and 4.2), most of which is undertaken by men.  Employment is 
varied and includes teaching, health care services and working for 
provincial government departments and the two oil palm companies 
in the province. 
 
Off-farm employment does not necessarily lead to reduced oil palm 
production.  Generally, off-farm employment constrains oil palm 
productivity when it limits the labour available for harvesting and 
block maintenance.  However, with rising population density on 
smallholder blocks, off-farm employment is playing a very important 
role in relieving the social and economic pressures on the blocks by 
providing much needed supplementary income (Koczberski et al., 
2001).  Indeed, on the more populated blocks that we visited at Bialla 
(and Hoskins), family members in full-time employment often 
provided considerable income support to other block residents and 
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capital for farm and non-farm investments.  They often met large 
expenses such as school fees, farm inputs, customary payments, and 
provided start-up capital for small businesses.  Off-farm employment 
therefore can provide investment capital as well as reduce the social 
tensions and conflicts between family members that arise over the 
distribution of oil palm income on highly populated blocks.  This has 
the effect of increasing social stability on the schemes and thus 




The economic pressure to generate supplementary incomes, 
especially on the LSS schemes is reflected by the positive 
relationship between numbers of non-oil palm income sources and 






Table 4.2.  Numbers of non-oil palm income sources by mean block population for 
Bialla and Hoskins LSS schemes. 
 
  Mean Population per Block 
LSS Scheme One non-oil palm 
income source 
Two non-oil palm 
income sources 
Three or more non-
oil palm income 
sources 
Bialla LSS 9.4 10.1 12.2 
Hoskins LSS 11.2 13.1 15.9 
(Source: Smallholder Surveys n=200) 
 
These data suggest that economic diversification among LSS 
smallholders is driven largely by population and land pressures.  An 
increasing proportion of second and third generation settlers are now 
unable to access resources in their ‘home’ villages, and hence 
population growth rates on the leaseholder blocks are likely to rise 
leading to further income diversification (for a fuller discussion of 
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this issue see, Chapter 4.2.2 of Koczberski et al., 2001; also Curry and 
Koczberski 1999). 
 
VOP smallholders also pursue income diversification, though for 
different reasons.  As mentioned earlier, VOP smallholder pursue 
cash crop diversity to reduce income risk against fluctuating 
commodity prices, and as we argued in the 2001 study among 
Hoskins smallholders: 
 
On the VOP subdivisions income diversification is 
facilitated by more than adequate access to land (e.g., 
land for other cash crops such as cocoa and copra), 
whereas on the populated LSS blocks diversification is 
driven by inadequate access to land.  In other words, 
land shortages in the context of rising population 
pressure compel LSS settlers to diversify income 
sources, whereas VOP landowners’ greater access to 
land offers opportunities for income diversification that 
may or may not be taken up  
(Koczberski et al., 2001, 77).  
 
Subsistence Production 
In addition to lowering livelihood risks by pursuing and 
strengthening strategies that increase and diversify cash income 
sources, oil palm smallholders also reduce livelihood risks by 
maintaining subsistence food production.  Most LSS settlers and 
VOP smallholders rely on food gardening, and, in the case of coastal 
VOPs, also on fishing. 
 
Most LSS and VOP smallholders grow sufficient food to meet their 
household requirements, and the majority of LSS women sell surplus 
garden produce at local markets.  Usually food gardens on the LSS 
subdivisions are located on the rear two hectares of the block, the 
area originally reserved for smallholder food gardens.  However, on 
some blocks in the older subdivisions of Wilelo, Balima and Tiaru, 
OPIC extension officers encouraged smallholders to plant the rear 
two hectares to oil palm.  This advice was given because of the 
- 37 - 
 
 
company delay in poisoning old palms in the First and Second 
Phases.  Given that most of the old palms were too tall for 
harvesting, OPIC thought it in the best interests of smallholders to 
plant the Third Phase to oil palm to allow them to earn an income 
while they waited for the first two phases to be poisoned (Chapter 6). 
This move undoubtedly helped maintain smallholder cash incomes, 
though the extent to which medium-term household food security has 
been undermined has yet to be determined. 
 
The Bialla study did not examine the importance of food gardens for 
smallholder food security.  Research among Hoskins and Popondetta 
LSS smallholders revealed that smallholders rely heavily on 
subsistence food production.  Based on a 24 hour dietary recall 
survey over a six week period, Koczberski et al. (2001) found that 
approximately 80% of meal ingredients at Kavui LSS (Hoskins) and 
Popondetta were from food gardens.  Meals containing at least one 
non-garden ingredient tended to be concentrated within the first week 
following the monthly oil palm payment to smallholders.  Given the 
similar socio-economic circumstances of Bialla and Hoskins LSS 
smallholders, it is not unreasonable to suggest that food gardens are 
likely to make a significant contribution to smallholder diets in 
Bialla.  It should be noted, however, that the dietary surveys 
undertaken at Hoskins and Popondetta in 2000-2001 were during a 
period of depressed oil palm prices (K50-K70/tonne).  It is possible 
that 2002-2003 prices (K160-K200/tonne) have lessened 
smallholders’ dependence on subsistence food production.  The 
relationship between population, food production, and oil palm prices 
is an area requiring further investigation. 
 
As well as meeting household dietary requirements, food gardens 
provide an additional source of income for women and their families.  
Eighty-nine per cent and 86% of Bialla LSS and VOP smallholders 
respectively market regularly (at least once a week), and 60% of 
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smallholder households reported food marketing as their primary or 
secondary income source2.  Local markets provide essential income 
for smallholder households, especially non-primary or visitor 
households on multiple household blocks.  Importantly, market 
income is earned regularly and provides for families in the periods 
between oil palm payments.  The fact that women dominate local 
markets means that a significant proportion of market income is 
likely to be spent on family needs. 
 
Finally, fishing is an important activity in many of the coastal VOPs.  
Twenty-one per cent of VOP blocks reported fishing as an income 
source, and several noted that fishing provides a fall-back income 
when prices of commodity crops fall.  It appears that like coastal 
VOP growers in the Hoskins scheme, Bialla VOP growers shift their 
labour between fishing and commodity production depending on 
relative prices.  For example, during the 2001 survey at Gaungo VOP 
(Hoskins scheme) when oil palm prices were relatively low 
(K56/tonne), some households temporarily abandoned oil palm 
production to concentrate on fishing.  A study in two villages in New 
Ireland which owned copra plantations showed that fish landings 
were negatively correlated with the mean annual copra price (Dalzell 
and Wright 1990). 
 
Customary Economy 
Like Hoskins and Popondetta, and throughout Papua New Guinea for 
that matter, customary exchange remains a central part of most 
people’s lives.  Customary exchange between individuals and groups 
is mainly concerned with developing (or repairing in the case of 
conflict) alliances, social relationships and obligations.  Exchange 
items include daily gifts of cooked and uncooked food, subsistence 
and oil palm labour, various services, traditional and modern wealth 
items and cash contributions to major events to mark initiations, 
marriage, birth, death, adoptions, dispute settlements, and land 
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transfers.  Importantly, nowadays, customary exchange is also an 
important source of capital for business ventures, land purchases and 
education investments in children. 
 
The conventional view in Papua New Guinea is that customary 
exchange activities are a constraint on economic development, 
particularly the development of a market economy.  It is often held 
that such activities divert people’s attention and efforts away from 
market economic activities such as cash crop production to 
uneconomic social activities leading to periodic labour shortages and 
thus the intermittent production of, say, oil palm.  While this is true 
up to a point, changes in the types of items used in customary 
exchange and socio-demographic changes in the smallholder 
population mean that the requirements of customary exchange can 
drive people’s involvement in the market economy/oil palm 
production.  For example, store bought goods (cash required) and 
cash itself have largely replaced traditional wealth items in 
customary exchange, and the cash requirements of customary 
exchange are now an important reason for people engaging in the 
market economy.  Thus, for the most part, customary exchange has 
become a driving force for people’s engagement in the market 
economy whether as wage labour or as cash crop producers.  
 
Also on the land settlement schemes, where there is a more than 
adequate potential supply of labour for cash crop production, labour 
diverted to customary exchange activities is unlikely to contribute to 
labour shortages for oil palm production.  In fact, given the role of 
these activities in the formation of social relationships and conflict 
resolution they are likely to have a positive influence on oil palm 
production through creating a more stable social environment.  The 
problem of under-utilised labour (and under-production) in the 
smallholder oil palm sector in Bialla, and the other schemes, can 
seldom be attributed to customary activities disrupting oil palm 
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production.  Instead, labour shortages are largely the result of the 
absence of a remuneration mechanism that guarantees payment of 
labour.  We return to this point in Chapter 5. 
 
Summary  Smallholders engage in a range of economic and social activities, and 
oil palm is not always the main activity or focus of people’s lives.  
For some blocks, where multiple households reside, oil palm income 
alone may not be sufficient to support all residents and some 
households may need to seek supplementary sources of income.  As 
indicated earlier, it is probable that as population and land pressures 
continue to rise on the LSS, it will become necessary for an 
increasing proportion of block residents to be engaged in non-oil 
palm economic activities, both on and off-farm.  Economic 
diversification on the LSS schemes in Bialla (and Hoskins) is 
therefore expected to increase over the coming years. 
 
Population growth on the LSS contains both risks and opportunities 
for the oil palm industry. If economic diversification and the 
generation of supplementary income sources can keep pace with 
population growth, then there is no reason to suggest that population 
growth will undermine oil palm production.  In fact, oil palm is likely 
to remain the cornerstone of the local economies in both Bialla and 
Hoskins and provide a platform upon which broader economic 
development can occur.  The oil palm industry is well placed to 
provide this platform for two reasons.  First, it injects large amounts 
of cash into the local economies in both regions; and, secondly, the 
monthly cash injections are dispersed throughout the local economies 
with a significant proportion of the local population being paid 
directly for oil palm either as smallholders or as plantation labourers. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that many multiple household blocks 
diversify their income sources as a strategy to maintain social 
harmony and reduce income risks, both of which are important in 
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encouraging investment in farm inputs such as replanting and 
fertiliser.  Thus, indirectly, income diversification is important for the 
long-term economic and social viability of the smallholder sector.  In 
the next chapter this theme of social cohesion is discussed further in 
relation to the labour and income strategies that households employ 
in oil palm production. 





1. He began with one box of 50 chicks and by reinvesting his profits 
he built up his business until he was raising 200 chickens at a 
time. 
 
2. When families report food marketing as their primary or 
secondary income source, they are referring to the fact that 
marketing provides them with a regular (weekly) income source 
that meets their day-to-day needs.  This is especially the case on 
multiple household blocks where individual households may 
receive an oil palm cheque only three or four times a year.  In the 
intervening periods between oil palm cheques these families are 
heavily reliant on income earned from sales at local markets. 




SMALLHOLDER OIL PALM PRODUCTION: 






Production Smallholder production in Bialla has been increasing steadily over 
the last five years (Table 5.1), though 2002 productivity levels at 
13.6 tonnes per hectare remain much lower than nearby Hoskins 
smallholder yields at 16.3 tonnes per hectare.  There is great 
variability in productivity amongst smallholders in terms of tonnes 
per hectare.  Also, through time individual smallholders can shift 
from high to low production and vice-versa.  Such shifts in 
productivity depend on several factors including stage in the life 
cycle (demographic change), health status, whether or not social 
conflict is present on the block, absenteeism and other socio-cultural 
factors.  Together these variables impact on household resources and 
labour allocation.  This chapter examines the household labour issues 
that influence oil palm production.  Chapter 6 then discusses broader 
agronomic and farm management practices affecting the productivity 
of Bialla smallholders. 
 
As the smallholder sector develops over time, different smallholder 
household types are emerging, and these influence the ways in which 
labour is organised and remunerated.  Single household blocks, 
caretaker households and multiple co-resident households are the 
three primary types of smallholder households on the Bialla Scheme.  
The first part of the chapter outlines the main features of these 
different household types and draws out the implications for oil palm  
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production.  Attention then turns to discussing the issues surrounding 
household labour shortages, the under-utilisation of household labour 
and why a market in hired labour has not emerged on the land 
settlement schemes. 
 
Table 5.1. Bialla smallholder production (tonnes) from 1997 to 2002. 
 
BIALLA SMALLHOLDER PRODUCTION 
YEAR TOTAL 
HECTARES 
SMALLHOLDER    
FFB PRODUCTION* YIELDS** 
1997 9,355 99,174 10.6 
1998 9,843 116,665 11.8 
1999 10,559 133,791 12.6 
2000 11,250 151,359 13.4 
2001 12,182 158,888 13 
2002 12,182 165,241 13.5 
(Data supplied by HOPL and OPIC-Bialla) 
 
*    FFB production includes fruit sold by Bialla smallholders to HOPL and NBPOL. 








This section describes the different types of household production 
units commonly found on the Bialla scheme.  We draw on a 
typology of smallholder households developed in the 2000-2001 
Hoskins and Popondetta study (Koczberski et al., 2001) as it became 
apparent from the Bialla survey findings and the workshop with 
OPIC-Bialla that this typology also applies at Bialla.  
 
The typology is based on the types of smallholder households 
residing on a block and the harvesting strategies they employ in oil 
palm production.  When the Bialla LSS started over two decades 
ago, there was generally only one household that settled on the block 
– the original settler household.  Now, the sons of the original 
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settlers have grown up, married and continue living on the block, and 
often there are other close relatives residing permanently or 
temporarily on the block.  Today, therefore, it is not unusual for 
several households to be co-residing on a block. 
 
On some blocks, the original household may be residing elsewhere 
and a ‘caretaker’ is managing production.  In some cases the 
original, now elderly, leaseholder and his wife may be still living on 
the block, but their children work in other parts of the province or 
country.  Thus, the single nuclear family managing a block, which 
dominated the oil palm schemes when they were first established, is 
being replaced by other household configurations. 
 
The different household types (single, caretaker and multiple) and 
the dominant harvesting strategies employed on a block can be used 




• Single household wok bung 
• Caretaker household 
• Multiple household wok bung 
• Multiple household markim mun 




As a result of population growth, multiple household blocks are 
becoming the norm on the older subdivisions.  Mean population per 
LSS and VOP block respectively is 11.08 and 9. 
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The various household types are associated with oil palm harvesting 
strategies that differ in the ways that labour is organised and 
remunerated.  The communal  wok bung production strategy where 
all or most adult family members and co-resident households 
participate in harvesting and block maintenance and share the 
resultant income is no longer the only form of labour organisation 
(Table 5.2).  Whilst most blocks (71%) continue to practice wok 
bung harvesting, a rotation harvesting strategy is becoming more 
common in which harvesting work and oil palm income are rotated 
on a monthly basis among co-resident households.  This type of 
production organisation is called markim mun by smallholders, and 
27% of blocks have adopted this harvesting strategy (Table 5.2). 
 













LSS BLOCKS 67% 1% 32% 
VOP BLOCKS 82% 3.50% 14% 
TOTAL LSS/ 
VOP BLOCKS 71% 2% 27% 
(Source: Smallholder survey) 
 
As shown in Table 5.2 there is a higher proportion of VOP wok bung 
blocks (single or multiple household) than amongst LSS blocks, and 
harvesting often involves reciprocal exchanges of labour with village 
relatives.  Single household wok bung blocks are also common on the 
new LSS subdivisions of Soi and Kabaiya, reflecting the recent 
development of these subdivisions. On the older LSS subdivisions 
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there is a smaller proportion of single household wok bung blocks.  
These blocks belong to the original leaseholders whose sons, for 
employment reasons, have moved elsewhere in the province or to 
other parts of PNG.  For these elderly leaseholders labour shortages 
can be a problem, and are reflected in such practices as ‘skip-
harvesting’ where the block, or a portion of the block is harvested 
once a month or less. 
 
The ways in which labour is differently organised and remunerated 
between the various harvesting strategies are outlined in Table 5.3. 
Blocks with a wok bung strategy usually share the monthly oil palm 
income amongst family and household members, whereas on markim 
mun blocks the monthly income is typically allocated to an 
individual household on a rotating basis.  Levels of labour 
remuneration also differ between wok bung and markim mun 
harvesting strategies.  Labour remuneration on a multiple household 
markim mun block is usually commensurate with labour input and 
there is limited in-kind payment of labour. 
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Table 5.3.  Labour and labour remuneration characteristics by household and 
harvesting type. 
    
HOUSEHOLD 
TYPOLOGY 
LABOUR AND PAYMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
    
• Wok bung for harvesting and lus frut collection.  
• All or most adult family members involved in harvesting 
SINGLE 
HOUSEHOLD WOK 
BUNG • Oil palm income shared among household members 
• Single household  
• Wok bung for harvesting 
CARETAKER 
HOUSEHOLD 
• Family income depends on payment arrangements with block 
owner 
• Wok bung for FFB harvesting 
• All or most adult family members involved in harvesting 
• Inter-household labour cooperation 
• FFB income shared among adult males of all households 
• Lus frut collection rotated each month amongst households 
(women from one household usually collect the fruit) 
MULTIPLE FAMILY 
WOK BUNG 
• Lus frut income allocated monthly to adult women from one 
household 
• FFB and lus frut harvesting rotated monthly between different       
households on block 
• Limited inter-household labour cooperation 
• Block labour under-utilised 
• FFB income is rotated among male heads of households 
• Lus frut income rotated among female heads of households 
MULTIPLE FAMILY 
MAKIM MUN 
• Each month the two incomes will go to two different households 
• Wok bung for FFB harvesting 
• Inter-household labour cooperation 
• FFB income is rotated among male heads of households 






• Each month the two incomes will go to two different households 
 
Some blocks display a ‘mixed’ production strategy where adult 
members of each household on the block work together (wok bung) 
for the harvesting but rotate the oil palm income each month 
amongst co-resident households.  Sometimes in a mixed harvesting 
- 49 - 
 
 
strategy, co-resident households move in and out of wok 
bung/markim mun strategies to suit their changing socio-economic 
and demographic circumstances.  In this mixed strategy, wok bung is 
the dominant form of harvesting, and markim mun may be used on 
occasions when a household requires a relatively large sum of 
money to pay school fees, fund a visit to the home village, or pay 
for a visitor’s return trip to the village. 
 
The mixed production strategy can be viewed as a transitional stage, 
where households, over a period of several years, gradually move 
from a wok bung to a markim mun production strategy.  The 
transition is often in response to population growth, changing 
household economic circumstances or to the collapse of centralised 
authority on the block following the death of the original 
leaseholder. 
 
The type of harvesting strategy adopted by smallholders reveals 
much about other aspects of farm management including labour 
supply, decision-making, income distribution, family and gender 
relations, production motivation, incentives to invest in the block, 
propensity to repay loans, and the range of livelihood strategies 
employed by block residents. 
 Population and 
Harvesting The relationships between numbers of households per block/block 
population and harvesting strategies are shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 
respectively.  The growing numbers of people and households per 
block often leads to social stresses that result in disputes over labour 
allocations and income distribution.  This can act to undermine the 
labour cooperation found in the wok bung strategy and lead to a 
block shifting from a wok bung to a markim mun strategy.  The 
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switch to a markim mun strategy is therefore a way of reducing 
conflict, not of maximizing income or oil palm production. 
 
Table 5.4.  Mean numbers of households per LSS and VOP block at Bialla 
using different harvesting strategies 
 









LSS BLOCKS 1.57 2 2.96 
VOP BLOCKS 1.59 2 2 
LSS & VOP 
BLOCKS 
1.58 2 2.82 
(Source: Smallholder survey) 
 
Table 5.5.  Mean population per block using different harvesting 
strategies at the Bialla and Hoskins oil palm schemes. 
 


















(Source: Smallholder surveys) 
 
Multiple household blocks that continue to work together in a wok 
bung or mixed strategy generally can be described as cohesive 
family units where cooperation and sharing remain important and 
where disputes over labour or income rarely disrupt oil palm 
production.  The high level of inter-household cooperation at harvest 
time results in an adequate labour supply leading to complete and 
regular harvesting. 




 Impact on 
Oil Palm The type of household production unit affects the supply of labour 
through how labour is recruited, deployed and remunerated.  It 
therefore has a direct influence on block production and 
productivity.  The main ways in which these household production 
units influence block production and productivity are summarised in 




WOK BUNG HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION UNITS  
AND OIL PALM PRODUCTION  
 
• Labour shortages on single household wok bung blocks often lead to incomplete or 
irregular harvesting.  Skip-harvesting is more likely to occur on these blocks where 
labour is short or where other activities take labour away from oil palm production.  
The latter is common on VOP blocks.  There is no disincentive to investment. 
 
• The single household wok bung blocks most prone to labour shortages are those on 
the LSS that have limited access to additional off-block labour.  These households 
may have restricted kinship ties or social networks, and, for a range of reasons, are 
unlikely to hire labour to overcome labour shortages. 
 
• Multiple household wok bung blocks have the greatest capacity for production.  
Disputes over FFB income distribution are uncommon which means that there is 
sufficient labour for harvesting and block maintenance.  Thus, an adequate labour 
supply and harmonious social and working relationships result in regular and 
complete harvesting.  There are no disincentives to invest in these blocks. 
 
• Changing circumstances on a multiple household wok bung block, such as the death 
of the father or increasing economic and population pressure, may lead to disputes 
over oil palm income and labour allocations.  The disputes, if protracted, may lead 
to households shifting from a wok bung production strategy to either a mixed or 
markim mun production strategy 
 





MARKIM MUN HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION UNITS 
AND OIL PALM PRODUCTION 
 
• A markim mun production strategy on multiple household blocks often emerges 
from a wok bung strategy as the number of co-resident households increases and 
disputes over income distribution and labour allocations begin to undermine inter-
household co-operation and social harmony. 
 
• Multiple household markim mun production strategies where minimal disputes 
occur over harvesting and where some labour is recruited from other households 
on the block, means that production can be consistently high. 
 
• Oil palm production and productivity can be low on multiple household markim 
mun blocks where disputes over income and labour lead to labour being 
withdrawn from oil palm production. 
 
• On some multiple household blocks (either markim mun or work bung), 
population and economic pressure can lead to complete and regular harvesting.  
Production is generally high and fluctuations in the price of oil palm appear to 
have little impact on production levels. 
 
• Multiple household markim mun production strategies tend to result in under-
utilised labour each harvest round.  Also, there can be major disincentives to 
invest in the block (e.g., fertiliser, block maintenance, loan repayments, etc). 
 
• There is a higher probability that multiple household markim mun blocks will 
attempt to evade loan repayments.  Each household will attempt to maximise its 
income in its allocated month by avoiding loan deductions.  The costs of such an 
action are shared by all households on the block. 
 
• On Multiple household markim mun blocks, there is a higher probability that 
block maintenance or farm investment (such as replanting) will be neglected or 
disputed.  For an individual household wishing to minimise its labour expenditure 
while maximising its income, it makes more economic sense not to engage in 
block maintenance as the benefits of such labour (higher yields) are dispersed 
amongst all resident households including those that did not contribute to block 
maintenance.   
 
• Oil palm productivity is higher on highly populated blocks that have not adopted 
a rotation (markim mun) strategy.  Multiple household blocks that harvest 
together tend to have more people working each harvest round and therefore 
harvest more of the crop.  Under a rotation strategy where fewer block members 
participate in each harvest round, harvesting is more likely to be incomplete. 
 




To summarise this section, the household typology provides a means 
to examine some of the constraints on the supply of labour in oil 
palm production.  It is evident that the era of the single household 
block is drawing to a close as a result of population growth and as 
multiple household blocks become more common at Bialla.  While 
32% of LSS blocks have adopted a markim mun strategy, this 
proportion will increase as it has in the older Hoskins scheme where 
60% of LSS blocks have now adopted this harvesting strategy.  As 
the social configurations on the oil palm blocks change as a result of 
population growth, smallholders are responding by adopting new 
strategies that may not be aimed primarily at maximising oil palm 
income, but which aim to maintain social stability and harmony 
amongst block residents.  Thus if a markim mun strategy is adopted 
as a way to resolve internal conflict on a block, total production may 
be less than if all adults worked together (wok bung) to harvest oil 
palm.  In this situation a household working on its own during a 
harvest round may not have access to sufficient labour to undertake a 
full harvest.  This is particularly the case when the markim mun 




Harvesting This final section of the chapter examines household labour issues 
and under-harvesting in more detail.  To examine the extent of 
under-harvesting we draw on two sets of data.  First, an OPIC ‘late 
pickup’ survey and, second, the research team’s post-harvest survey 
data from 57 blocks in four LSS subdivisions (Wilelo, Balima, Soi 
and Kabaiya). 
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OPIC Late Pickup Survey 
The late pickup survey gathered data on the numbers of extra nets of 
fruit stacked for collection when the fruit collection truck was 
delayed for 24 hours or more.  In 2002, HOPL was concerned that 
the tonnage of fruit harvested by smallholders for collection by 
company or contractor trucks was frequently underestimated by 
OPIC1.  This meant that extra trucks had to be redirected by HOPL 
to collect the additional fruit thus disrupting transport schedules and 
leading to the inefficient use of trucks.  OPIC attributed the disparity 
between predicted and actual tonnages to late pickups thereby giving 
smallholders more time to harvest fruit.  In November 2002, OPIC 
counted the nets in those sections of Wilelo (one of the earliest LSS 
subdivisions in Bialla) and Soi (a recent LSS subdivision) and 
Porkisi VOP where the truck was one or more days later than the 
scheduled pickup day (Table 5.6). 
 
Table 5.6.  Expected and actual numbers of nets of fruit collected in a 
harvest pickup round in November 2002 when harvest truck was more 











Wilelo (older LSS) 231 362 57 
Soi (recent LSS) 362 456 26 
Porkisi (VOP) 133 169 27 
TOTALS 726 987 36 
(Source: Data supplied by OPIC-Bialla) 
 
 
Across the three subdivisions, late pickups resulted in an increase in 
production of 36%.  Soi LSS and Porkisi VOP had similar increases 
of 26% and 27% respectively, but the most significant increase was 
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in the older subdivision of Wilelo where production increased by 
57%.  Wilelo is a subdivision with many elderly growers and where 
delayed replanting has resulted in large areas of very tall palms 
which are much more difficult and time-consuming to harvest.  
Delayed pickups thus allowed more time for harvesting. 
 
It is important to note, however, that the additional fruit harvested 
because of the delayed pickup would not have been all wasted.  It is 
likely that a significant proportion of this fruit would have been 
harvested a fortnight later in the following harvest round.  Postponed 
harvesting though does affect fruit quality and a portion of this fruit 
undoubtedly would have been lost to the mill.  In summary, the 
increased tonnage of fruit during delayed pickups suggests that 
labour shortages are a factor, though the causes and nature of these 
labour shortages are more difficult to pinpoint.  They may be due to 
direct labour shortages or because poor time management has the 




…the toksave came on Friday morning [that the 
pickup would be on Monday].  But Saturday was 
church day [Seventh Day Adventist] and Sunday is a 
day for visiting and socialising.  There was not 
enough time to harvest all the fruit, so half the fruit in 
Phase 2 could not be harvested. 
 
(Smallholder grower, Kabaiya LSS)  
 
Post-harvest Survey 
Post-harvest surveys were undertaken to estimate the extent of 
under-harvesting. Surveys were conducted within two days 
following a harvest pickup and recorded harvesting rates from Phase 
1 at the roadside edge of the block through to Phase 3 at the rear of 
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the block.  The surveys were conducted with OPIC officers in June 
2002 in the older LSS subdivisions of Wilelo and Balima (33 blocks) 
and the more recent LSS subdivisions of Soi and Kabaiya (24 
blocks).  The results demonstrate a considerable level of under-
harvesting and also a very marked edge-effect in which harvesting 
rates decline from Phase 1 through to Phase 3 plantings at the rear of 
the block2 (Figure 5.1).  The results have been compared with the 
post-harvest data collected among smallholders in the Hoskins 



























PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
Figure 5.1.  Per cent of phases fully harvested for Hoskins and Bialla 
LSS and VOP schemes. 
 
 
Harvesting rates tend to be higher at Hoskins for all three planting 
phases on the LSS and the First Phase of VOP blocks.  The lower 
harvesting rates at Bialla LSS are suggestive of the reluctance to 
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harvest old palms on the older subdivisions (see Chapter 6).  
Because of the small number of VOP blocks in the survey with a 
Phase Two planting, it is not possible to draw any conclusions about 
differences in the harvesting propensities of VOP smallholders on 
the two schemes.  It should also be noted that the harvesting surveys 
were undertaken when oil palm prices were reasonably high (K120-
K130).  The high price may explain the higher than expected 
harvesting rates on Phase 1 of VOP blocks. 
 
While the Bialla survey was not large enough to estimate the annual 
losses of fruit in the Bialla scheme, some indication of potential 
losses can be gained by examining data from the nearby Hoskins 
scheme where a larger post-harvest survey was undertaken in May-
June 2002.  At Hoskins, total annual losses of smallholder fruit were 
conservatively estimated at over 60,000 tonnes per year, or around 
25% of production for 2001.  If we assume that smallholder under-
harvesting rates at Bialla are similar to those at Hoskins (a likely 
assumption), then in 2002, over 33,000 tonnes of smallholder fruit 
were not processed by the HOPL mill.  Thus, there is considerable 
potential to raise smallholder productivity and incomes at Bialla. 
 
The harvesting edge-effect, together with labour supply issues, 
across the two LSS schemes reveals the impact of distance from the 
road on harvesting practices.  On the LSS schemes at both Bialla and 
Hoskins less than half of Phase 3 plantings were fully harvested, 
compared with 55% and 74% of Phase 1 plantings at Bialla and 
Hoskins respectively.  The greater distance which fruit must be 
carted by wheelbarrow from the rear of the block may serve as a 
disincentive to harvesting.  However, a combination of factors is also 
likely to compound the effect of distance.  These may include 
insufficient labour or time to evacuate fruit from Phase 3 plantings, 
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age of blockowner, poor terrain (e.g. slopes, gullies, swampy 
ground), and minimal maintenance of oil palm stands at the rear of 
the block.  A discussion of household labour issues follows. 
 
 Household 
Labour Issues To better understand under-harvesting, not only of Phase Three 
plantings, but the whole smallholder block, it is necessary to 
examine household labour issues in more detail for it is at the 
household level where labour is mobilised, organised and 
remunerated.  Household labour shortages and the under-utilisation 
of labour are primary determinants of under-harvesting and low 




Limited HH labour 




• Skip Harvesting 
• Partial Harvesting 





















Figure 5.2. Flow chart of factors contributing to low smallholder productivity.  
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Labour shortages can be temporary or long-term and result in 
incomplete harvesting, skip harvesting, abandonment of blocks or 
the semi-abandonment of a portion of an oil palm block (usually at 
the rear of the block, or an old stand of oil palm awaiting replanting).  
There are three main sets of issues associated with the supply of 
labour.  They are: 
 
• limited resources of household labour; 
• the under-utilisation of available labour on the block; and  
• minimal use of hired labour. 
 
Each aspect is an outcome of various structural barriers and 
individual household circumstances that prevent labour from being 
deployed and adequately remunerated.  Each aspect is discussed 
below. 
 
Limited Resources of Household Labour 
Household labour shortages are the primary determinant of under-
harvesting and low productivity.  There are several types of single 
household blocks that experience labour shortages: 
 
• •elderly blockowners or widow households with one or no sons 
residing on the block; 
• •young married couples with young dependants; 
• •female-headed households without adult sons. 
 
These household types are concentrated in different subdivisions 
according to when the subdivisions were established.  Elderly block 
owners experiencing labour shortages tend to be concentrated in the 
older subdivisions of Wilelo, Balima and Tiaru.  Younger families 
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without adult sons are typically found in the newer subdivisions of 
Kabaiya and Soi.  Also, labour-short households, for various reasons, 
have limited access to additional off-block labour, due for example, 
to their restricted kinship ties or social networks.  Some single 
households are able to overcome long or short-term labour shortages 
through access to kinship labour (particularly VOP producers), social 
networks, adoption, hosting long-term visitors from their home 
villages or other forms of host relationships and/or by employing 
hired labour.  When these sources of additional labour are 
unavailable labour shortages can be ongoing and result in 
consistently low productivity and incomes and, therefore, a reduced 
capacity to invest in the block. 
 
Labour shortages can also be temporary, resulting in a shift to lower 
production.   This may be induced by illness, customary or religious 
obligations or short-term absences from the block.  Also, labour may 
be temporarily shifted away from oil palm to other more profitable 
economic activities, as in the case of coastal VOPs, where a seasonal 
abundance of fish or better returns on other cash crops may result in 
‘skip’ harvesting, partial harvesting or even temporary abandonment 
of oil palm production. 
 
Under-Utilisation of Available Labour 
The type of harvesting strategy used on a block influences the 
amount of under-utilised labour on a block.  As previously noted, the 
wok bung production strategy is usually more efficient than the 
markim mun strategy.  On markim mun multiple household blocks 
where there is little inter-household co-operation during harvesting, a 
harvest round may involve only one or two harvestors from one 
household, yet there may be three or four households and over 10 
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adults living on the block.  In this situation, a complete harvest may 
not be possible due to a ‘shortage’ of labour at harvest time. 
 
The under-utilisation of labour sometimes reflects a low 
commitment level to oil palm.  For many VOP growers, oil palm 
may not be their primary or sole income source and therefore oil 
palm harvesting may occur once a month or less, and only when 
additional cash is required (e.g., for customary purposes or to 
purchase expensive store items).  Growers’ commitment to oil palm 
varies depending on the price of oil palm, company transport issues, 
their relationships with the company and OPIC, block characteristics 
(e.g., swampy or hilly block or poor access), and debt levels.  Thus 
low oil palm prices together with irregular transport collection of 
fruit may lead some smallholders to temporarily withdraw their 
labour from oil palm production.  Similarly, as discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6, tall palms are a major disincentive to harvesting 
on many blocks on the older LSS schemes in Bialla. 
 
A common reason for the under-utilisation of available labour is the 
reluctance of people to provide labour because of inadequate and/or 
disputed remuneration of their labour.  Because of incomplete, 
deferred or non-payment of family labour (e.g., to brothers, wives, 
children), or hired labour (e.g., youth groups), the supply of labour 
for oil palm harvesting and block maintenance is constrained 
because people are reluctant to sell their labour.  This results in a 
great deal of under-utilised labour, particularly on blocks where 
there is a poor relationship between the caretaker and owner, and on 
the more heavily populated blocks on the older land settlement 
subdivisions, such as Balima, Wilelo and Tiaru.  On these more 
populated blocks conflict often emerges between fathers and sons 
over payments for oil palm work.  To some extent these conflicts 
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reflect inter-generational issues where young men challenge their 
fathers’ leadership on the block by disputing levels and types of 
remuneration. 
 
Inter-generational conflict can also be seen as part of wider socio-
economic changes occurring amongst smallholders, and in PNG 
more generally (see a similar discussion in Koczberski et al., 2001).  
For example, expectations surrounding payment for labour appear to 
be changing, especially among youth on the LSSs.  On many VOP 
and wok bung LSS blocks, labour payments often do not reflect 
labour inputs, but rather payment is governed more by gender, age or 
kinship status, and reciprocal or in-kind labour is common.  In-kind 
payments for labour often consist of cooked food.  However, 
reciprocal and in-kind labour are steadily being replaced by cash 
payments for labour that are more likely to be commensurate with 
market rates for labour.  Young men, particularly on the LSSs, want 
to be paid well for their work, whereas previously food or some 
other small payment was considered adequate.  Many sons are now 
challenging their father’s authority and traditional cultural norms 
surrounding labour and in-kind obligations.  Male blockowners told 
us how their son/s refused to work on the block and some reported 
how they evicted their son from the block because of continual 
arguments over payments.  Sons of blockowners also related stories 
of how their fathers underpaid them for their labour. 
 
Minimal Use of Hired Labour 
As mentioned above labour shortages are rarely overcome through 
the use of hired labour.  Only two of 103 blocks reported the regular 
use of hired labour.  There are several reasons why a market in 
labour has not developed in the smallholder sector, despite the large 
numbers of under-employed youth. The most important reason is
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the reluctance of young men to provide hired labour because of the 
uncertainty of payment for their labour by blockowners.  The 
employment of youth and youth groups for contract harvesting and 
block maintenance has been very limited and many groups have 
failed as a result of the ‘labour contract’ not being fulfilled (i.e., 
inadequate or non-payment of labour). 
 
Hence, the high level of uncertainty over fulfilment of the labour 
contract because of the absence of a mechanism to guarantee 
payment for work done inhibits the emergence of a labour market in 
oil palm production.  As the evaluation of the Mama Lus Frut 
Scheme in Hoskins revealed, low rates of loose fruit collection by 
women prior to the scheme were the result of limited and/or 
uncertain remuneration of their labour by their husbands3.  This was 
a frequent cause of domestic disputes and led many women to 
withdraw their labour from oil palm production to concentrate their 
efforts on food gardening where they had greater control over the 
income earned from the sale of garden produce.  By paying women 
directly for loose fruit collection, the scheme has removed much of 
the payment uncertainty when women relied on their husbands to 
remunerate them from the papa cheque.  As a result of this initiative, 
nearly 100% of loose fruit is collected in the Hoskins scheme. 
 
One solution to labour shortages caused by the under-utilisation of 
labour is to introduce initiatives that guarantee payment for hired 
labour.  This discussion, together with some recommendations for 
Bialla, is taken up in Chapter 7. 




Summary This chapter highlighted the major changes occurring in how 
household labour is organised and remunerated.  These shifts in 
harvesting practices reflect broader demographic, social and 
economic changes operating at the household and local level.  Not 
only are families finding new ways to organise labour as the number 
of households per block increases, but second generation settlers 
have very different expectations regarding payments for labour than 
their parents’ generation. 
 
As the smallholder population grows through time, the single 
household block that typified the land settlement schemes when they 
were first established is now giving way to the multiple household 
block where several co-resident households share the block’s 
resources.  As an increasing proportion of blocks support more than 
one household, smallholders are responding by diversifying their 
income sources and adopting new labour strategies in oil palm 
production.  The shift from the single household wok bung strategy 
to the markim mun strategy where harvesting labour and the 
corresponding monthly oil palm payments are rotated between co-
resident households on a monthly basis is probably the most 
important example of this change. 
 
It is important to note that the motivation to adopt new labour 
strategies in oil palm production is not necessarily concerned with 
maximising income.  There is evidence to suggest that the decision 
to switch to a markim mun strategy has much to do with maintaining 
social harmony amongst residents and is often viewed as a way of 
reducing social conflict on a block.  While these conflicts have their 
roots in the social consequences of declining per capita incomes 
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from oil palm, the markim mun strategy is often viewed as a strategy 
for restoring social harmony, NOT maximising income. 
 
Where the markim mun strategy emerged in response to ongoing 
social conflict, labour productivity can decline because a smaller 
proportion of the available labour on a block is employed in each 
harvest round.  In these situations a household whose month it is to 
harvest and collect the corresponding pay cheque may not be able to 
complete a full harvest each fortnightly round.  Thus, total annual 
production for the block may fall after adopting a markim mun 
strategy.  One third of LSS blocks at Bialla have adopted the markim 
mun strategy and this proportion is expected to increase through time 
as the population of settlers continues to grow. 
 
It would be difficult to increase productivity by promoting wok bung 
harvesting strategies through extension efforts because the 
underlying reasons for the switch in harvesting strategies would 
remain (i.e., population growth and social conflict).  To improve 
productivity the industry must promote smallholder strategies that 
lessen the causes of social conflict, and this entails developing new 
extension strategies that are cognisant of the new demographic and 
economic environment in the smallholder sector, particularly the 
LSS component of the scheme.  Some recommendations in this 
regard including alternative payment systems and income 
diversification strategies that increase the flexibility of labour are 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
While multiple household blocks are common and increasing, we 
must not lose sight of the large number of single household blocks 
that have a different set of constraints on productivity.  For example, 
there are the elderly leaseholders without sons (typically found on 
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the older subdivisions) for whom age is a factor constraining their 
labour productivity.  Some of these elderly leaseholders have stands 
of old palms that are almost impossible to harvest because of their 
height.  There are the younger, single families with children on the 
newer subdivisions of Soi and Kabaiya where limited social and 
kinship networks restricts the range of labour they can draw on 
during harvesting.  A third group is the number of caretaker blocks 
where low or uncertain payments for harvesting labour, or insecure 
tenure constrain block productivity and investment. To improve 
productivity, each of these single household types requires different 
extension strategies that meet their needs and circumstances.  
Suggestions as to how this can be achieved are outlined in Chapter 7. 




1. Growers indicate the number of nets they will put out for collection by 
attaching loose fruitlets to a stick where each fruitlet represents one net.  
OPIC counts these before a pickup and the total is used to calculate the 
number of trucks required to collect fruit in each section of a 
subdivision. 
 
2. The leaseholder on a block together with an OPIC extension officer 
estimated the numbers of nets of fruit unharvested in each planting 
phase of the block. 
 
3. The reluctance or inability of men to share some of the income with 
their spouse was due to the numerous demands on the monthly oil palm 
cheque including debt repayments, credit repayments at tradestores, the 
financial demands of immediate and extended family, and the social 
pressures on men to gamble and participate in beer drinking parties.  
Often these short-term cash demands greatly exceeded the value of the 
cheque with the result that women were often inadequately remunerated 
for their labour. 
 





SMALLHOLDER OIL PALM PRODUCTION: 





Introduction The previous chapter drew attention to the factors operating within 
households that limit labour availability for oil palm harvesting and 
block maintenance.  This chapter, while still emphasising the household, 
examines broader agronomic and farm management practices 
constraining smallholder productivity.  The four most important factors 
affecting the productivity of Bialla smallholders are: 
 
• • Low replanting rates on the older subdivisions. 
• • Limited rates of fertiliser application.  
• • Poor block maintenance. 
• • Low levels of motivation and commitment to oil palm 
production. 
 







Old and tall palms are a major factor explaining the low yields in 
Divisions 1 and 2, especially on the older LSS subdivisions of 
Division 2.  At the end of 2002, 3,600 hectares of palms required 
replanting, representing approximately 36% of the total area under 
smallholder management in Divisions 1 and 2. 
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A replanting program was scheduled to begin in 1995/96 but for 
various reasons was delayed until 1999/2000.  Since then the 
replanting program has performed poorly (Table 6.1).  In 1999, only 
334 hectares of OPIC’s target of 1,006 hectares were replanted, due 
to minimal support from the previous management of HOPL and 
seedling shortages for smallholders.  During the same year, NBPOL, 
which was collecting fruit from Tiaru and the Central Nakanai 
growers, poisoned 134 ha of old palms and provided growers with 
seedlings and credit for replanting (A.Vegoa, pers. comm.). 
 











1999 1,006 334 
2000 500 250 
2001 n.a. 100 
2002 n.a. 18 
 
 (Source: Data supplied by OPIC-Bialla ) 
 
In 2000, only half of the 500 hectares targeted for poisoning and 
replanting was achieved, due mainly to a company decision to halt 
the poisoning program and remove smallholder credit facilities for 
replanting.  In 2001, only 100 hectares were replanted as company 
credit facilities and Rural Development Bank (RDB) funds were 
unavailable to fund smallholder replanting. 
 
Credit constraints on replanting continued into the first half of 2002, 
and together with the drought and heightened risk of fire (Plate 6.1), 
minimal replanting occurred that year1.  Most of the replanting in 
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2002 was in Division 1 (A. Vegoa, pers. comm.).  By mid 2002 the 
RDB-Bialla had K400,000 available for replanting, sufficient for 400 
hectares or 11% of the total area requiring replanting.  OPIC 
presented the Bank with a list of 328 ‘priority’ blocks for credit 
(defined as those blocks that met the Bank’s criteria – see below).  
However, by February 2003 only 80 growers had replanting loans of 
K1,700 approved by the RDB (T. Valu, Manager, RDB-Bialla, pers. 
comm.). 
 
The low uptake of the RDB loans is partly explained by the bank’s strict 
criteria for loan eligibility.  To be eligible for an RDB loan, smallholders 
must have: 
 
• A third planting of oil palm in production. 
• No outstanding land rental fees. 
• A copy of the lease title documents. 
 
These criteria automatically exclude a large number of growers that do 
not have a Third Phase planted to oil palm and growers with insufficient 
land to plant a Third Phase.  Also, given the importance of food 
production for home consumption and local markets, this criterion 
undermines food security.  An additional group ineligible for RDB loans 
are the many growers with outstanding land rentals, and those who have 
lost their lease title documents2. 
 
The replanting program is currently being reviewed by HOPL 
following a change of company management.  Replanting is now a 
priority for OPIC and the milling company, and the replanting target 
for 2003 is 1,012 hectares (Vegoa 2002).  HOPL is also considering 
extending interest-free credit to smallholders for palm poisoning and 
possibly seedlings. 









Plate 6.2.  Underplanted palms at Tiaru LSS subdivision. 
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Delayed replanting has had considerable impacts on production, 
income levels, farmer motivation and farm management practices. 
Loss of income is the most serious problem confronting smallholders 
with tall palms, many of whom have semi-abandoned their old 
plantings because their harvesting poles are too short.  On many of 
these semi-abandoned plantings, growers are practicing ‘selective’ 
harvesting, where they harvest only those palms where the fruit is 
within reach of their harvesting poles.  Exacerbating this problem are 
growers with damaged or short harvesting poles, who are unwilling 
to buy new harvesting poles because their old palms are earmarked 
for replanting.  Many of these growers borrow harvesting poles from 
neighbours or relatives and may miss a harvest round if no poles are 
available.  Some of these growers planted a Third Phase of oil palm 
in the mid to late 1990s and rely on these new plantings for most of 
their oil palm income.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, OPIC encouraged 
these growers to plant a Third Phase because of the protracted delay 
in the replanting program for Phases 1 and 2. 
 
On some blocks with old and tall palms, growers practice ‘skip’ 
harvesting or partial harvesting because of the lower quantity of ripe 
fruit each harvest round and the longer time and greater physical 
effort required to harvest tall palms.  The difficulty of harvesting tall 
palms is compounded by an elderly population of blockowners on 
the older LSS subdivisions.  
 
Growers often referred to the lower quantity of fruit on their old 
palms relative to younger Phase 3 palms.  The lower quality of fruit 
is likely to be an outcome of not only the age of the palms (past their 
most productive stage), but also inadequate application of fertiliser 
over the years, and poor maintenance of old stands3 (see below).  Our  
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field observations in July 2002 at Wilelo and Balima indicate that 
maintenance of old palm stands is negligible and sexava outbreaks 
can go untreated for prolonged periods.  On those blocks ready for 
replanting and where sexava is present, some in the industry argue 
that it is necessary to treat palms for sexava before they can be 
poisoned for replanting.  This could further delay the replanting 
program on the older subdivisions4. 
 
A final aspect of the replanting progam is the serious long-term 
consequences of underplanting that occurred on some blocks.  We 
were unable to confirm the extent of underplanting, but observed 
several cases at Tiaru and one at Kiava VOP where seedlings were 
underplanted in 1999/2000 (Plate 6.2).  These underplanted palms 
were stunted and had very poor fruit development.  Palms 
underplanted in 1999 were not producing fruit at the time of 
fieldwork in mid 2002. 
 
Explaining Low Replanting Rates 
Putting aside the institutional factors underlying the delayed 
replanting programs, smallholders themselves also show much 
reluctance to replant.  Interviews with smallholders indicated that 
they were reluctant to replant for several reasons including a 
disinclination to go into debt, potential short-term losses of income, 
old age, poor road conditions and un-reliable fruit pickups. 
 
Bialla smallholders, like those of Popondetta (see Koczberski et al., 
2001) are averse to taking out bank loans with high interest rates.  
Many smallholders have poor repayment rates.  Moreover, many do 
not wish to go into debt at the same time when their income from the 
block is reduced due to poisoning two hectares of mature palms. 
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Indeed the loss of income alone is a considerable disincentive for 
many smallholders, especially those on the more populated blocks 
and on two hectare VOP blocks where growers would need to rely 
on non-oil palm income sources while waiting for their new palms to 
bear fruit.  On blocks with four hectares of oil palm, replanting is 
arguably an easier option when two hectares remain in production, 
although several growers stressed that their reduced income would 
be insufficient to cover basic household needs. 
 
Also, replanting is much less likely to occur on caretaker blocks 
where the leaseholder is living elsewhere.  While the absentee 
leaseholder retains ‘ownership’ of the block and therefore can either 
sell the block or return to live on it, caretakers are unwilling to invest 
in replanting when they bear the costs of replanting but the benefits 
of higher production and income may not accrue to them.  
 
Two other groups of growers who are typically reluctant to replant 
are ‘hobby’ farmers or ‘semi-retired’ farmers who do not see a need 
to replant.  These growers are more likely to be low to medium 
producers who have only a partial commitment to and interest in oil 
palm production.  For these growers, oil palm is a resource that can 
be tapped into occasionally as the need arises.  ‘Hobby’ farmers are 
found amongst VOP producers where a range of subsistence options 
and alternative cash crops reduces the need to replant.  As long as 
they are able to earn some income from their tall stands of oil palm, 
these growers will find it unnecessary to commit to a substantial 
investment in replanting. 
 
The ‘semi-retired’ farmers are to be found amongst elderly 
leaseholders on the older LSS subdivisions.  Without dependants and 
relatively low cash needs these elderly producers may be satisfied 
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with a low rate of productivity and see no pressing need to replant, 
especially if they have difficulties recruiting labour for harvesting.  
Without sufficient harvest labour, these elderly producers would find 
it very difficult to repay their replanting loans. 
 
Finally, road conditions and company transport-related issues affect 
grower commitment to oil palm production including replanting.  
Poor road conditions mean that company and contractor trucks 
require continual repairs, resulting in fewer trucks available for FFB 
collection and less reliable FFB collection schedules.  When fruit 
collection is unreliable because of impassable roads or unreliable 
harvest pickup schedules, smallholders become less confident about 
investing (replanting) in their blocks.  These issues were also 
important in explaining poor replanting rates among Popondetta 
smallholders (Koczberski et al., 2001).  Developing smallholder 
confidence in the oil palm industry is thus critical not only for 
smallholder investment in replanting but a whole range of production 
issues. 
 
The factors identified above serve to discourage replanting.  Debt 
levels, potential income foregone, poor roads and unreliable harvest 
pickups, either singly or in combination are major disincentives to 
replanting.  Such problems are not easy to overcome, though it is 
recognised that HOPL’s new management team is moving to address 
these issues, especially transport problems.  However, problems like 
road maintenance require long-term solutions that are largely outside 
the control of the industry.  Some recommendations to improve 
replanting rates are outlined in Chapter 7. 








A noticeable characteristic of the Bialla scheme compared with the 
Hoskins and Popondetta schemes is the large number of blocks with 
poor agronomic practices, especially among the older subdivisions of 
Tiaru, Wilelo and Balima.  Poor agronomic practices include 
inadequate levels of fertiliser application, damaged (or a lack of) 
harvesting tools and generally low levels of block maintenance. 
 
 Low Fertiliser
Use It is recognised in the industry that low fertiliser use by smallholders 
is a major agronomic constraint on smallholder productivity.  Of 
surveyed growers in the Bialla scheme just less than 3% had applied 
fertiliser in the first half of 2002 and 36% in 2001 (Figure 6.1).  
However, for 27% of LSS blocks and 68% of VOP blocks, the last 
application of fertiliser was sometime before 2000.  Those most 
unlikely to apply fertiliser are VOP growers and growers from the 
older LSS subdivisions.  In the older LSS subdivisions of Wilelo, 
Balima and Tiaru, the last time fertiliser had been applied for 30% of 
growers was before 2000 (Figure 6.1).  Some growers who replanted 
or planted an additional two hectares of oil palm in the last three 
years have yet to apply fertiliser.  It should be noted, however, that 
in all oil palm project areas the promotion of fertiliser among 
smallholders has proven to be a difficult task for OPIC and the 
milling companies. 
 
A combination of factors appears to explain the low rates of fertiliser 
use among Bialla smallholders.  The three primary reasons to emerge 
from interviews with smallholders were: 
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• negative experiences with the company fertiliser credit scheme; 
• lack of knowledge of fertiliser use and the potential yield and 
income benefits from fertiliser application; and 
• a general perception amongst smallholders that the cost of 
fertiliser outweighs any economic gain from fertiliser use, 
especially during periods of low oil palm prices. 
 
 


























Figure 6.1.  Year of most recent fertiliser application on the Bialla scheme. 
(Source: Smallholder survey) 
 
 
Negative Experiences with the Company 
While interest-free company credit schemes for fertiliser have 
worked with some success in Hoskins and Popondetta, at Bialla the 
scheme was plagued with management problems for several years 
and this has contributed to a situation where many smallholders are 
now reluctant to purchase fertiliser from the company.  At Bialla, the 
mismanagement of the fertiliser scheme under a previous company  
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management regime, has made the task of promoting fertiliser 
application that much more difficult than in other oil palm project 
areas.  A common complaint by Divisions 1 and 2 smallholders, 
concerned a delivery of fertiliser in 1999 that was delivered to blocks 
without consent forms signed by smallholders.  Many of these 
growers also complained that they were later charged 2001 prices for 
the fertiliser, and some complained that deductions continued after 
full payment for the fertiliser.  On several  blocks the 1999 fertiliser 
delivery remains at the roadside edge of the block or under the 
house. 
 
These experiences with the milling company have created a mindset 
amongst many smallholders that the company cannot be trusted and 
that it uses the fertiliser credit scheme to generate further profits at 
smallholders’ expense.  While the fertiliser credit scheme is now 
improving under new company management, a more difficult 
challenge for the company and OPIC to address is overcoming the 
distrust of the company by some smallholders. 
 
Growers’ Lack of Knowledge of Fertiliser Use and Potential Benefits 
of Fertiliser Application 
It was clear from interviews that many growers had little knowledge 
of the recommended application rates and methods, and many did 
not appreciate the general agronomic benefits of fertiliser.  Many 
growers were unconvinced of the economic and agronomic benefits 
of fertiliser.  Indeed, as demonstrated in the following section, for 
low producers there may not be any perceptible increase in income 
following fertiliser application; the only visible effect of fertiliser 
being the monthly deductions for fertiliser from their pay cheques.  
Together these factors (lack of knowledge about fertiliser, reluctance 
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to go into debt and poor returns to low producers for investment in 
fertiliser) explain the reluctance of growers to purchase fertiliser.  
 
Questionable Economic Benefits of Fertiliser? 
Alongside negative perceptions of the company’s fertiliser credit 
scheme and the lack of knowledge about fertiliser benefits is a view 
amongst smallholders that the price of fertiliser has increased to 
unreasonably high levels.  From 1998 to 2002, when the PNG Kina 
devalued markedly, the price of ammonium chloride fertiliser for 
Bialla growers increased from K17 in 1998 to K295 in 2002.  The 
recommended annual application rate of 20 bags for four hectares at 
Bialla now costs K580 (K781 at Hoskins6).  For some growers, 
especially ‘part-time’ VOP growers and other ‘low’ producers who 
regularly under-harvest, the high price of fertiliser and the prospect 
of debt with the company are considerable disincentives to 
purchasing fertiliser.  For these growers the investment in fertiliser is 
difficult to justify.  It is to this issue we now turn. 
 
In December 2002, to assess the economic costs and benefits of 
fertiliser for smallholders we undertook a preliminary economic 
analysis of fertiliser use with Dr Paul Nelson of OPRA.  Using yield 
data from OPRA’s fertiliser trials in WNB, we examined cash 
returns to growers under several scenarios using the variables of FFB 
price, smallholder harvesting rate (per cent of crop harvested) and 
fertiliser price (Figure 6.2; Table 6.2).  Expected yield increases of 
four tonnes of FFB per hectare per year are based on the average of 
several of OPRA’s fertiliser trials over a number of years.  Of 
course, actual yield response to fertiliser depends on many farm 
management and bio-physical factors which cannot be taken into 
account in this exercise.  It should also be noted that yield effects lag 
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behind fertiliser application.  Nevertheless, the exercise casts some 




























Figure 6.2.  Break even FFB price plotted against rate of harvesting for Hoskins 
 (K39.05/bag) and Bialla (K29/bag).  Prices are for 2002. 
(Data provided by Paul Nelson, 2003, OPRA Popondetta) 
 
 
Two key points can be drawn from Figure 6.2: 
 
1. The slope of the curve increases as harvesting rate declines.  This 
means that for a high producer, harvesting 95% of the crop, a 
drop of 10% in the proportion of the crop harvested will have 
only a relatively small effect on the FFB price increase required 
for this grower to break even.  On the other hand, a 10% fall in 
the harvesting rate for a low-producing grower, usually 
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harvesting, say 40% of their crop, requires a much greater 
increase in the FFB price to break even.  Thus, consistently high 
producers will receive much greater income gains from fertiliser 
application than low producers. 
2. The impact of a fertiliser price increase has a much greater 
negative impact on low producers than high producers (Figure 
6.2).  For a high producer, an increase in fertiliser price requires 
only a relatively small increase in FFB price for these growers to 
reach a new breakeven point.  For low producers, a relatively 
large increase in FFB price is required to reach the new 
breakeven point.  In summary, the income benefits from fertiliser 
application may be marginal or even negative for low producers 
who do not fully harvest their crop. 
 
To understand the choice facing smallholders to apply fertiliser or not, 
it is useful to consider the net income gains/losses from fertiliser 
application under several scenarios using different FFB prices and 
harvesting rates.  Table 6.2 shows the net income gain per hectare 
using a range of FFB prices and harvesting rates at Bialla and 
Hoskins.  For example, a Bialla smallholder receiving a price of 
K150 per tonne for FFB with a harvesting rate of 75% will receive a 
net annual income gain per hectare of K305 (K25.4/ha/month) by 
applying the recommended quantity of fertiliser.  If the price of oil 
palm falls to K50 per tonne, then the same grower (maintaining a 
harvesting rate of 75%) will receive a net annual income gain per 
hectare of K5.  As the table indicates, most low producers (i.e. 
harvesting less than 50%) receive few financial benefits from 
applying fertiliser. 
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Table 6.2.  Net income gain per hectare for Bialla and Hoskins smallholders using different FFB 
prices and harvesting rates (Shaded areas indicate net income gains greater  
than or equal to K10/Ha/month). 
 
 







NET ANNUAL GAIN 




NET ANNUAL GAIN 




25 -95 -145 
50 -45 -95 
75 5 -45 
 
50 
100 55 5 
25 -45 -95 
50 55 5 
75 155 105 
 
100 
100 255 205 
25 5 -45 
50 155 105 
75 305 255 
 
150 
100 455 405 
25 55 5 
50 255 205 
75 455 405 
 
200 
100 655 605 
 
 
If we assume a grower will perceive a net income gain of K10/month 
per hectare from fertiliser application (anything less than this would 
not be obvious to growers)7, then for many growers fertiliser 
application has no perceptible impact on their incomes.  For many 
low producers for whom low production is attributable to under-
harvesting, the cost of fertiliser will outweigh any potential income 
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gains. It is therefore understandable that for some ‘low’ producers 
(i.e., blocks where under-harvesting occurs), an annual investment of 
K580 in fertiliser may not be considered economically attractive nor 
sound cash management.  Thus, the disproportional negative impact 
on low producers who regularly under-harvest may be one of the 
reasons why OPIC has had such difficulty encouraging some 
growers to purchase fertiliser. 
 
This brief economic analysis of fertiliser brings into question 
conventional strategies of fertiliser promotion by OPIC, OPRA and 
the milling companies. 
 
 
Levels of block maintenance
Poor Block 
Maintenance   vary greatly across the three 
smallholder divisions and between LSS and VOP blocks.  Our 
observations during the smallholder survey and interviews, reveal 
that block maintenance was generally poorer on VOP blocks than 
LSS blocks, a finding consistent with surveys at Hoskins and 
Popondetta.  Further, on the new LSS subdivisions of Soi and 
Kabaiya block maintenance was significantly better than on the older 
subdivisions of Wilelo, Tiaru, and Balima. 
 
A range of factors underpin poor block maintenance among Bialla 
smallholders, the most important being: 
 
• Labour diverted to other household livelihood activities (see 
Chapter 4).  This is more relevant on the VOP blocks. 
• Labour shortages and the under-utilisation of available labour.   
• Low rates of loose fruit collection on some blocks resulting in 
palm circles not being maintained. 
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• Older plantings of tall palms that are semi-abandoned on the older 
LSSs. 
• Lack of grower motivation. 
 
Rates of loose fruit collection are low on the VOP blocks at Bialla 
with only 40% of VOP blocks having registered ‘lus frut mamas’.  
This compares with 73% of LSS blocks at Bialla that have ‘lus frut 
mamas’.  Evidence from the Hoskins scheme (Lewis 2000) reveals 
that block maintenance improved considerably following the 
widespread uptake of the mama card.  This was mainly for two 
reasons.  First, with greater participation in oil palm production, 
women tend to maintain palm circles to enable easier collection of 
loose fruit.  Second, the existence of the mama card means that it is 
easier for men to pay women for block maintenance work by placing 
some FFB on the mama net.  That so few Bialla VOP blocks are part 
of the mama scheme may partly explain the low levels of 
maintenance on these blocks.  Also, at Bialla, FFB is not permitted 
to be weighed as loose fruit, and this may limit the amount of female 
labour deployed in oil palm production, particularly block 
maintenance.8   
 
The low levels of block maintenance found on the older LSS 
subdivisions appear to be the result of extensive areas of oil palm 
requiring replanting.  As noted earlier, many growers have almost 
ceased harvesting their tall palms, and invest minimal labour in 
maintaining these stands.  Poor block maintenance on these older 
subdivisions is reflected in the large areas treated for sexava in 2001.  
For example, at Wilelo, 20% of the total subdivision was treated for 
sexava in 2001, and for Tiaru and Balima the areas treated 
represented 15% and 12% respectively of the total areas of these 
- 85 - 
 
 
subdivisions.  Table 6.3 shows the levels of sexava infestation on 
these older subdivisions, with the three older subdivisions of Wilelo, 
Tiaru and Balima making up 38.6% of the total area in West New 
Britain requiring chemical treatment in 2001. 
 
 
Table 6.3.  Oil palm areas in West New Britain that required chemical 










APPROX AREA (HA) 
NBPOL plantation Togulo 32 
NBPOL plantation Malilimi 60 
Hoskins VOP Ganeboku 1.5 
Hoskins LSS Kavui 19 
Bialla LSS Kabaiya 200* 
Bialla LSS Wilelo 240 
NBPOL plantation Togulo 80 
NBPOL plantation Bilomi 150 
Bialla LSS Tiaru 112 
Bialla LSS Balima 96 
NBPOL plantation Togulo 70 
TOTAL  1,160.5 
 
(Data provided by Rob Caldwell, 2002 OPRA, Hoskins) 
 
* The Kabaiya sexava outbreak is related to the sexava problems at 
Navo plantation spreading into the LSS. 




Motivation Smallholder motivation is a key factor influencing productivity.  The 
motivation to harvest regularly and invest in one’s oil palm holding 
is influenced by a range of inter-related factors including: 
 
•  access to alternative income sources; 
•  subsistence security; 
•  age of grower; 
•  levels of debt; 
•  tenure security; 
•  customary obligations and demands; 
•  levels of social conflict on the block; 
•  relations between settlers and customary landowners; 
•  numbers of dependants; 
•  economic pressures; 
•  competitive nature of individual smallholders; 
•  physical characteristics of blocks; 
•  relationships with milling company and OPIC; 
•  regularity and certainty of harvest pickups; 
•  road conditions. 
 
The last three factors are of most relevance to explaining under-
harvesting and poor block maintenance amongst Bialla smallholders. 
 
As mentioned briefly in earlier sections of this report, the 
relationship between smallholders, the company and OPIC 
deteriorated in the mid-1990s.  HOPL management ceased paying 
the OPIC levy and began withdrawing services to smallholders.  
Until the management change in 2002 there was little liaison and 
cooperation between the company and OPIC.  From 1997 to 2002 
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HOPL ceased paying the K3.50/tonne levy to OPIC (see Chapter 2).  
This placed severe financial constraints on OPIC and limited OPIC’s 
capacity to provide extension services to growers.  Smallholders, 
who continued to pay their levy, complained of the poor services 
they received from OPIC.  Delayed fruit pickups (a problem of the 
company - see below), also raised smallholder dissatisfaction with 
OPIC. 
 
At the same time as the OPIC problems, smallholders were 
disillusioned with HOPL.  The delay in the replanting program, the 
problems with the fertiliser credit scheme, unreliable fruit pickups 
and the under-weighing of smallholder fruit have, together, 
undermined smallholder motivation and interest in oil palm, and 
caused a loss of confidence in the company. The most common 
grievances we heard from smallholders were the unreliable 
schedules for harvest pickups and the under-weighing of fruit by 
private trucks contracted to the company (and sometimes company 
trucks). 
 
References to contractor trucks cheating smallholders by recording 
lower tonnages were noted in interviews in all three divisions, as 
were tales of ongoing delays and irregular fruit pickups.  For most of 
1998 there was only one harvest round per month.  Harvest rounds 
increased to two per month for most of 1999, but for the period 
October 2000 to August 2001, harvest rounds were reduced again to 
once a month, and in a few subdivisions to more than 30 day 
intervals (A. Vegoa, pers. comm.).  During this period relationships 
between smallholders and the company were tense, and some 
smallholders vented their frustration with the company by attacking 
trucks and setting up road blocks.  Since October 2001 transport has 
improved and is becoming more regular and reliable. 
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The uncertainty of regular pickups is equally as damaging to grower 
motivation as the lack of payment certainty for hired labour (Chapter 
5).  Deferred or under-payment of hired labour results in the 
withdrawal of labour, conflict and disruptions to harvesting.  
Similarly, continual uncertainty regarding pickups of smallholder 
fruit results in the withdrawal of labour, conflicts with the company 
and disruptions to harvesting as people shift their labour to activities 
where the returns to their labour are assured.  Thus, reliable and 
regular fruit pickups will increase smallholders’ motivation to 
harvest and invest in their blocks. 
 
Whilst the company is addressing the transport problem through 
restructuring company transport procedures and improving milling 
capacity, the deteriorating road system (including bridges) will 
continue to disrupt transport schedules until considerable funding is 
made available by the provincial government and overseas donors to 
rebuild and maintain existing roads.  Bialla LPC and OPIC have 
made four submissions to the provincial government for road 
maintenance funds and neither has received a response from the 
provincial government.  A World Bank commissioned report 
released in 2001 estimated that K21.4m is required to rehabilitate the 
roads in the Bialla scheme (ADS [PNG], 2001).  OPIC estimates that 
of the total 720km of roads in the Bialla scheme, almost 200km were 
built when the scheme started and are in need of complete 
reconstruction.  The remaining road system is also in need of urgent 
repair.9 
 
OPIC has identified the poor and deteriorating condition of the 
existing road system and the lack of provincial funding as major 
constraints on smallholder oil palm production in Bialla (Vegoa 
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2002).  OPIC is correct in this assessment: if roads were upgraded, 
transport schedules would become more regular and reliable, and 
smallholder motivation to produce oil palm would increase and their 
confidence in the company would rise accordingly.  OPIC-Bialla, on 
commenting on the road situation, noted in its 2002 report: 
 
To date OPIC in Bialla has only received from the 
West New Britain Provincial government K25,000 in 
1998 and compared to the 720 km plus of harvest 
roads we have in the project, this only amounted to 
K0.03/metre (Vegoa 2002, 15). 
 
This chapter outlined how a conjunction of factors working together 
contribute to the low productivity of Bialla smallholders.  
Institutional factors combined with a range of inter-related socio-
economic factors form part of the explanation as to why 
smallholders are reluctant to replant old palms, purchase and apply 
fertiliser, and maintain and invest in their blocks.  
Summary 
 
To effectively address some of these farm management issues a 
reappraisal of existing extension strategies employed by OPIC and 
HOPL may be necessary.  For example, with regard to fertiliser use, 
if low producers are unable to realise the income benefits from 
applying fertiliser, then the increased debt loads they incur from 
purchasing fertiliser may have the effect of further reducing their 
motivation to produce oil palm.  It may also lead some to seek ways 
to avoid loan repayments.  Thus, it makes little sense to promote 
fertiliser use amongst smallholders who regularly under-harvest.  
Instead, for very low producers consistently under-harvesting their 
blocks, it may be more appropriate to consider fertiliser promotion 
together with other initiatives aimed at raising the harvesting rates on 
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these blocks.  The Mobile Card may be useful here.  This issue is 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
At the other end of the production scale, there is a clear case for 
promoting fertiliser use amongst high producers fully harvesting 
their blocks.  For these growers the income gains from fertiliser are 
tangible and readily observable. In short, it may be worthwhile for 
the industry to become more selective in promoting fertiliser by 
targeting high producers in the first instance, or only those blocks 
where the impact of fertiliser is likely to be realised as net increases 
in smallholder incomes. 
 
In summary, addressing farm management issues is not 
straightforward and there is no single quick-fix.  For sustainable 
long-term solutions, the industry must avoid relying solely on 
technical fixes to particular problems, and instead develop and 
implement a range of interlocking strategies to meet the needs of 
smallholders and build smallholders’ confidence in the industry over 
the long-term.  By building confidence in the industry, smallholders’ 
motivation to produce oil palm and make long-term investments in 
their blocks will grow as a consequence.  In the next chapter, we put 
forward some strategies to achieve these long-term goals. 





1. Fires during the 2002 drought destroyed 61 hectares of 
smallholder oil palm (A. Vegoa, pers. comm). 
 
2. The requirement of RDB loans that a Third Phase must be 
planted to oil palm and generating an income is based on the 
assumption that blockowners with tall palms and without the rear 
2 ha planted to oil palm would have little capacity to repay the 
loan.  Also, for the RDB, loan recovery would be more secure if 
a Third Phase were planted to oil palm. 
 
The requirement that a block has no outstanding land rental fees 
is difficult for some smallholders to prove.  In late 2002 Lands 
Department personnel from Port Moresby were in Bialla 
collecting outstanding land rental fees from leaseholders.  
Smallholders had to produce receipts for land rental payments 
made in previous years.  If receipts could not be produced they 
were deemed to be in default of payment.  Any old receipts, 
together with new ones issued during the Lands Department 
visit, were taken by Lands personnel with the promise that they 
would be returned to them from Port Moresby once the records 
in Port Moresby were updated. 
 
3. The impact of climatic events like drought cannot be ignored. 
 
4. There is debate in the industry about the need to treat sexava 
infested oil palms before replanting.  It is argued by some that 
poisoning infested palms in the absence of sexava treatment 
merely displaces the sexava outbreak to adjoining stands of oil 
palm. 
 
5. In 2002, Bialla smallholders were charged K26/bag plus K3 
spreading cost for fertilser.  The K3 spreading cost is refunded to 
the smallholder following fertiliser application.  This initiative is 
similar to that introduced in Hoskins in 2000 where the K3 cash 
refund provides an incentive for growers to apply fertiliser.   
 
6. At Hoskins the price of a 50kg bag of fertiliser increased from 
K24.20 in 2001 to K39.05 in 2002. 
 
7. This arbitrary figure of K10/ha/month probably errs on the 
conservative side, meaning that the point where growers notice 
an income rise in response to fertiliser is likely to be higher than 
K10/ha per month or K120/ha per year. 




8. Loan repayments are deducted from the primary payment of the 
household head and not from loose fruit payments.  By not 
permitting some FFB to be weighed as loose fruit, one avenue 
for avoidance of loan repayments is closed to Bialla 
smallholders.  However, for debt-free blocks, this restriction 
constrains labour flexibility by limiting the ways in which 
labour and income can be allocated on a block, thereby possibly 
reducing productivity. 
 
9. Some bridges destroyed by earlier flooding in 1990s have not yet 
been replaced.  Flooding in March 2003 has also caused further 
destruction of roads and bridges in the Bialla region. 










Introduction Under-harvesting is the main constraint on smallholder productivity 
in the Bialla Scheme.  While insufficient fertiliser application, old 
palms and low levels of block maintenance are also important 
constraints on smallholder productivity, they are secondary to under-
harvesting.  The importance of these constraints varies across the 
three divisions.  On the older subdivisions, for example, where 
replanting is long overdue, poor block maintenance and under-
harvesting are major constraints on production, whereas fertiliser 
application is consistently low on VOP blocks.  On the newer LSS 
subdivisions of Soi and Kabaiya where productivity is higher, labour 
shortages are a major constraint on production.   
 
Finding ways to increase smallholder production requires 
understanding the processes underlying each of the above 
constraints, and how they interact to influence smallholder 
production and the uptake of extension advice and other industry 
initiatives.  In this final chapter we briefly outline the major 
agricultural changes occurring among smallholder households and 
highlight the key factors limiting smallholder productivity at Bialla.  
The suggested recommendations aim to increase smallholder 
production and incomes, and ensure a viable smallholder sector into 
the future.  The recommendations are based on both an attempt to 
overcome a production problem, and, on strengthening smallholder 
livelihoods.  Our work with smallholders suggests that when 
smallholders are assessing new industry and extension initiatives 
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they often focus on how a potential innovation or extension strategy 
fits into and strengthens their existing livelihood strategies and 
household needs.  This assessment can be at three levels (Box 7.1): 
 
1. In terms of how a potential intervention reduces/increases 
risks (e.g., income, food and land security). 
2. How it expands/restricts income opportunities (e.g., new 
mechanisms of income distribution and range of choices).  
3. Whether or not the intervention will promote/undermine 
household social cohesion and stability. 
 
 
Box 7.1.  Smallholder criteria for assessing new innovations 
RISKS OPPORTUNITIES SOCIAL STABILITY 
Household Livelihood Household Options Social Well-Being 
Economic security. Widen Choices. Intra & inter household conflict. 
Food security. Increases oil palm production.   
Land security. Enhances peoples capacity to 
meet their needs. 
Community social stability. 
  Distributes income more 





Industry initiatives or extension messages perceived to conflict with 
or undermine livelihood security are therefore much less likely to be 
adopted by smallholders.  A good example of this is the reluctance 
of smallholders to replant.  For many smallholders the short-term 
risks of income loss and increased debt levels outweigh any long-
term benefits, and therefore it is difficult for many to commit to a 
replanting package.  Similarly, for many low producers fertiliser 
application is not perceived as a means to increase income, but rather 
as a drain on income.  Where potential conflicts exist between
- 95 - 
 
 
 livelihood security and a new initiative, it is important for extension 
efforts to be tailored in ways that avoid such conflicts.  In other 
words, extension should aim to cater to the individual circumstances 
and needs of smallholders. 
 
With the above points in mind, the recommendations made in this 
chapter are based on a set of principles that the research identified as 
playing a crucial role in determining the successful uptake of 
interventions by smallholders.  Apart from encouraging the 
participation of smallholders in the design and development of new 
initiatives, as far as possible, initiatives should seek to: 
 
 
• increase incomes and well-being; 
• promote sustainable livelihoods through increasing 
household choices and food and income security; 
• strengthen people’s capacities to meet their basic 
needs; 
• contribute to a stable social environment; 
• facilitate the distribution of income within and 
between households; 
• avoid creating inequitable access to income or 
resources (e.g., land); and 
• be compatible with household livelihood strategies 
aimed at maintaining economic and social well-being. 
 




The Bialla results, together with the findings from Hoskins and 
Popondetta, indicate that major socio-demographic and agronomic 
transformations are occurring among smallholder households.  These 
changes set the context for understanding contemporary smallholder 
production and for formulating appropriate smallholder 
interventions. 
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One of the most significant agronomic changes to emerge 
amongst smallholders is the development of new harvesting and 
income strategies in oil palm production.  These shifts in 
harvesting practices are related to population growth and the 
emergence of different household configurations.  The single 
household block that typified oil palm production when the schemes 
were first established is now giving way to other configurations such 
as caretaker blocks and multiple household blocks where, in the 
latter case, two or more families are co-residing and sharing the 
resources of a block.  In the newer subdivisions of Soi and Kabaiya 
and recently incorporated VOPs, blocks tend to be managed by 
younger families, and the single household family with young 
dependants is common.  On the other hand, in the older subdivisions 
of Wilelo, Tiaru and Balima, there is a higher proportion of multiple 
household blocks where the sons and daughters of the original 
leaseholders are sharing the block with their parents while raising 
their own families.  Also, on these older subdivisions there tend to be 
more blocks with elderly leaseholders whose sons have found work 
elsewhere.  In each of these examples the circumstances of block 
residents are different and the problems they face in oil palm 
production may require different strategies to address them. 
 
One response to the changing demographic circumstances on the 
blocks is for some Bialla smallholders to shift from wok bung to a 
markim mun harvesting strategy.  This change in harvesting 
strategies has also occurred at the Hoskins scheme.  The increase in 
the number of blocks switching from the ‘traditional’ communal, 
wok bung harvesting and income strategy to the more individualised 
markim mun harvesting strategy where harvesting work and the 
corresponding income is rotated each month amongst co-resident 
households, raises two critical production issues. 
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The first key point is that the communal, wok bung strategy makes 
more efficient use of the available labour on a block than the markim 
mun strategy.  In a wok bung strategy it is more likely that all able 
residents will be involved in harvesting and block maintenance, 
whereas on a markim mun block often a considerable proportion of 
resident labour is not involved in harvesting or maintenance.  In the 
latter case this can mean that a household whose turn it is to harvest 
may have insufficient labour to complete a full harvest despite the 
presence of often a considerable amount of under-utilised labour on 
the block.  This situation is more likely to be the case if markim mun 
harvesting was adopted as a strategy to reduce conflict on the block 
and there is little inter-household cooperation in oil palm production.  
Thus, total production on the block is less than if all available labour 
were deployed each harvest round.   
 
This, of course, does not imply that the wok bung strategy will 
necessarily lead to higher production (though productivity per 
available worker on the block is higher) because there may not 
always be sufficient labour in total on a wok bung block to undertake 
full harvesting.  This is usually the case for younger households 
residing on the newer subdivisions and for elderly leaseholders on 
the older subdivisions without kin to call upon for assistance with 
harvesting.  Put another way, the highest production and productivity 
per worker in oil palm is likely to be on multiple household blocks 
still practising wok bung harvesting strategies. 
 
The second critical production issue is that wok bung tends to be 
associated with ‘traditional’ patterns of labour arrangements and 
payments whereas the markim mun strategy is often associated with 
market rates of remuneration.  The distribution of oil palm income 
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on wok bung blocks is often governed by gender, age and kinship 
status which means that some members of the work group receive 
disproportionately greater rates of remuneration than other members. 
 
The switch between harvesting strategies, therefore, represents a 
fundamental shift in how people view their social and economic 
relations and is indicative of an increased emphasis on market 
economic relationships rather then ‘traditional’ social and economic 
relationships.  As one might expect, this change is being led 
primarily by a younger generation no longer content with the ‘old 
ways’.  While this is partly driven by the economic imperatives of a 
growing population it also reflects intergenerational changes in 
aspirations and expectations.  Better educated than their fathers, 
second generation settlers now expect and demand to be paid market 
rates for their labour. 
 
These new expectations, and the resultant shift to a markim mun 
strategy, are often the outcome of conflict and on-going social 
tensions between co-residents on a block.  Conflicts often emerge on 
the monthly payday and sometimes erupt in violence particularly 
between fathers and sons and between brothers.  Thus, the higher 
expectations of a younger generation together with falling per capita 
incomes from oil palm as a result of population growth are 
contributing to these social tensions and conflicts. 
 
Another major transformation occurring on smallholder blocks is 
the diversification of non-oil palm income sources.  Oil palm is 
now one of many income sources smallholders pursue as they 
respond to population and economic pressures.  Many smallholders 
now seek supplementary income to augment oil palm income to 
maintain and strengthen their livelihoods.  Income diversification is 
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being driven by second generation settlers as they reach adulthood, 
marry, and establish their own families on their parents’ blocks.  It 
should also be emphasised that a further purpose of seeking 
supplementary income sources is to maintain social cohesion and 
harmony amongst co-resident individuals and households. 
 
The livelihood strategies that smallholders pursued when they first 
settled the schemes now appear much broader and include 
supplementary cash crops, increased reliance on food production for 
sale at local markets (and for domestic consumption), small business 
development (mostly stores and poultry production), wholesaling of 
betel nut and off-block employment.  There is some evidence that 
off-block employment is a significant source of capital for 
investment in farm inputs, start-up capital for small businesses, 
housing and education. 
 
Food production has always been important for meeting household 
consumption needs as has the income earned by women selling food 
at local markets.  However, the importance of income earned from 
food production for household well-being is increasing as the 
numbers of families per block rises and per capita income from oil 
palm declines.  Some families on multiple household blocks now 
depend primarily on local markets for their livelihoods.  Food 
production, whether for domestic consumption or for sale at local 
markets, is a fundamental component of the livelihood strategies of 
the vast majority of LSS and VOP smallholders.  Accordingly, the 
long-term viability of the smallholder sector depends to a 
considerable extent on the food and income security provided by 
access to gardening land.  This is especially so during periods of 
depressed oil palm prices. 
- 100 - 
 
 
It is probable that as population and land pressures continue to rise 
on the LSS, an increasing proportion of settlers will be engaged in 
non-oil palm income activities, both on and off-farm.  Economic 
diversification is therefore anticipated to increase on the LSS 
schemes at Bialla (and Hoskins) over the coming years.  There is 
little doubt, however, that population growth, particularly on the LSS 
scheme, contains both risks and opportunities for the industry.  On 
the LSS scheme continued population growth in the absence of a 
corresponding growth in income opportunities is likely to lead to 
greater social instability, especially if population growth were to fuel 
disputes between customary landowners and settlers.  However, if a 
broadening of the economic base is promoted and it generates new 
income opportunities in line with population growth, then social 
instability is less likely to occur. 
 
Through these projected demographic, social and economic changes, 
oil palm is likely to remain the cornerstone of the local economies by 
providing a platform upon which broader economic development can 
occur.  The labour intensiveness of the oil palm industry (compared 
with, say, mining) means that considerable amounts of cash are 
widely dispersed amongst the populations and local economies of 
Bialla and Hoskins as payments to smallholders and wages to 
plantation labourers.  This broad distribution of income in both local 
economies means that the conditions are present for more broadly-
based economic development to occur.  This process has 
commenced with diversification of income sources amongst settlers 
and VOP producers, the latter because of greater land availability. 
 
By drawing attention to new ways in which smallholder oil palm 
labour is being organised and remunerated and the expanding 
income sources found on smallholder blocks, the study highlights the 
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adaptability of smallholders to respond to pressures and the changing 
circumstances on their block.  While some smallholders are more 
successful than others in responding to change, or in taking up new 
opportunities, the overall picture is one of smallholders actively 
finding solutions and seeking new ways to maintain their livelihoods 
and household well-being.  Further, by emphasising the changing 
context in which oil palm production now occurs, the study provides 
a more solid base from which to understand the factors affecting 
smallholder production and to develop appropriate extension 
interventions. 







In this section we briefly review the main constraints on smallholder 
production and outline some possible solutions to increase 
smallholder production. 
 Under- 
Harvesting We conservatively estimate that over 30,000 tonnes of smallholder 
fruit are lost to the Hargy mills each year, largely as a result of 
under-harvesting.  While the primary cause of under-harvesting 
relates to constraints on the supply of labour for harvesting and 
block maintenance, the problem can be broken down into several 
components that vary amongst the key household types identified in 
the project area.  First, however, mention must be made of the strong 
edge-effect identified both at Bialla and Hoskins, because this 
provides some clues about the nature of the problem. 
 
Harvesting Edge-effects 
The consistent and strong edge-effect in harvesting rates at both 
Bialla and Hoskins reveals the effect of distance on labour 
utilisation.  Smallholders tend to concentrate their harvesting labour 
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at the front of the block nearest the roadside where the harvested 
fruit is stacked for collection by mill trucks.  At the rear of the block 
harvested fruit often must be carted by wheelbarrow 200m or more 
to the roadside edge.  Therefore, in a situation where labour 
shortages result in incomplete harvesting in a single harvest round, 
smallholders make the most use of available labour by concentrating 
on harvesting the fruit nearest the road.  In this way smallholders are 
maximising the amount of fruit that can be harvested each round 
given the available labour.1 
 
While the edge-effect provides evidence that there are constraints 
limiting the supply of labour in smallholder oil palm production, the 
nature of these constraints and how they operate are difficult to 
identify.  Also, the impact of the edge-effect on harvesting rates 
raises broader questions relating to the promotion of Phase 3 
plantings at the rear of the block and applying fertiliser on the Phase 
3 where harvesting rates are low.   More information is required to 
understand how distance from the road affects strategies of labour 
utilisation and other farm management issues. 
 
Labour Supply Issues 
The supply of labour both within and between blocks is constrained, 
and is the primary reason for under-harvesting in the Bialla scheme. 
Labour shortages on many low population blocks and the social 
constraints that prevent labour being deployed on more populated 
blocks, contribute to high levels of under-harvesting.  The absence of 
a market in labour in the smallholder sector exacerbates this 
situation.  Confounding these issues further is the fact that many 
smallholder producers are ‘hobby’ or part-time growers/semi-retirees 
who produce to a level to achieve a target income.  When this target 
income level is reached their motivation to produce oil palm declines 
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rapidly.  Amongst this group would be some elderly LSS 
leaseholders (semi-retirees) without dependants and who, because of 
their health status and advanced age, are reluctant to work any harder 
and longer than is necessary to meet some minimal material 
requirements.  Their economic aspirations tend to be lower than a 
younger family who, because of their younger age and higher 
educational attainment, tend to have higher material aspirations. 
 
The largest component of the hobby/part-time farmer group, is VOP 
producers, who have a range of cash crop and subsistence options.  
For many VOP producers, their level of engagement in oil palm 
production is much more sensitive to relative cash crop prices, the 
demands of the customary economy and other subsistence options.  
Falling oil palm prices are therefore more likely to lead to a larger 
decline in VOP production than in LSS production because the 
latter’s options are much more constrained. 
 
Blocks facing absolute limits on labour supply tend to be single 
household blocks who, for a range of reasons, cannot call on kinship 
labour or are unwilling or unable to hire labour.  Growers with 
insufficient labour on the block to assist with harvesting and block 
maintenance tend to be elderly leaseholders without sons living on 
the block, younger married leaseholders with dependant children and 
some caretaker blocks.   
 
To overcome absolute labour shortages on single household blocks it 
is necessary for labour to be recruited off-block.  The Mobile Card 
currently being trialled at Hoskins is one potential solution (see 
Koczberski et al., 2001: 195-199).  Given that a market in hired 
labour has not developed in the smallholder sector because of non-
compliance with the ‘labour contract’, a mechanism that ensures 
- 104 - 
 
 
payment of labour may overcome this problem and increase the 
supply of labour. 
 
At Hoskins, payment for Mobile Card labour is in FFB with a 
specified proportion of the fruit harvested using Mobile Card labour 
being used to pay that labour.  The reluctance or inability of 
blockowners to pay cash for labour is overcome and contract labour 
is guaranteed timely payment.  This payment transaction is attractive 
to blockowners because they are not required to outlay cash in 
advance and nor is it necessary for them to retain a portion of their 
monthly oil palm cheque for the payment of hired labour.  Thus the 
probability of the blockholder not complying with the labour 
contract (deferred, under or non-payment of labour) is greatly 
reduced. 
 
The principle underlying the Mobile Card – guaranteed payment of 
labour – could also be adapted for use on some multiple household 
blocks and low producing caretaker blocks where uncertain or 
disputed remuneration of caretakers has limited their productivity.  
For example, most caretakers rely on the leaseholder to pay them 
from the primary cheque each month.  When caretakers are 
underpaid or their payments delayed by leaseholders, they lose 
interest in oil palm production, and productivity can be consistently 
low. 




This study has identified under-harvesting as the major constraint on 
smallholder production.  We provide the following 
recommendations: 
 
Recommendation: the edge-effect in harvesting (and block 
maintenance) be investigated further with a small survey 
supervised by OPRA.   
The edge-effect should be investigated by surveying harvesting rates 
by phase for blocks with road access on only one side of the block 
and for blocks with road access both at the rear and front of the 
block (some subdivision sections at Hoskins have fruit collection 
points at both ends of the block).  If distance from the road is a key 
constraint on smallholder productivity then those blocks with both 
rear and front road access should have higher levels of productivity.  
Further, it would be useful to know how labour strategies vary 
between Phase 1 and Phase 3 plantings.  Do certain household 
configurations (e.g. single or multiple household blocks) lend 
themselves to higher harvesting rates at the rear of the block.? 
 
 
Recommendation: OPIC-Bialla and OPRA establish a trial of a 
version of the Mobile Card which is restricted to use on labour-
short blocks, particular multiple household blocks and caretaker 
blocks.  On caretaker blocks in the trial, the ‘caretaker card’ 
should replace the primary card.  
On markim mun, multiple household blocks that regularly under-
harvest despite the presence of under-employed labour, the principle 
of a Mobile Card could be used to free-up on-block labour.  The 
Card would function more like a secondary papa card, and be rotated 
each month between co-resident households2.  Remuneration on this 
secondary card would be by an agreed proportion of the fruit 
harvested on that card, with the balance being paid to the primary 
card.  Work associated with this new Card could be defined spatially 
(e.g., oil palm stands furthest from the road, thus reducing harvesting 
edge-effects), or the cardholder could work with the primary 
cardholder for that month.  In any given month, therefore, three 
households would receive income from oil palm: the household 
holding the primary card for that month (the largest oil palm 
payment); the household collecting loose fruit (the Mama Card); 
and, the household holding the Mobile Card (the secondary card). 
 
The principle of an ‘on-block’ Mobile Card should be trialled on 
caretaker blocks.  A new card (Caretaker Card?), with an agreed 
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percentage split on the crop between caretaker and leaseholder, 
would encourage caretakers to harvest more of the crop.  The 
caretaker would be guaranteed full and timely payment each month, 
and the incentive provided by a percentage split of the crop would 
raise caretaker productivity. 
 
 
Recommendation:  OPIC and OPRA to target under-harvesting 
in extension activities, especially during field days. 
Extension efforts to promote full and complete harvesting should 
emphasise the following issues: 
1. The higher production and income advantages of wok-bung over 
the markim mun harvesting strategies.  Here, the importance of 
family cooperation and social cohesion for regular full harvesting 
should be emphasised3.  
2. The income benefits to be derived by employing labour to 
achieve full harvesting – the Mobile Card could be promoted as a 
solution to labour shortages. 
3. Improve growers’ understanding of the potential income gains of 
fertiliser when combined with strategies to achieve full 






Old and tall palms on the older subdivisions of Wilelo, Tiaru and 
Balima are rarely fully harvested and many old stands are not 
harvested at all.  Harvesting tall palms is physically demanding work 
and too difficult for many elderly leaseholders.  Replanting was 
initially delayed when the milling company disrupted the replanting 
programme by withdrawing credit facilities for smallholders in the 
mid 1990s.  Replanting is now a priority for the new HOPL 
management and OPIC, and HOPL is considering extending credit 
facilities to smallholders for palm poisoning and possibly seedlings.  
In addition, in mid 2002, K400,000 became available through the 
Rural Development Bank (RDB) at Bialla for replanting. 
 
Factors contributing to low replanting rates include credit 
restrictions, an unwillingness by smallholders to go further into debt 
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(15% interest on RDB loans), short-term income losses following 
poisoning of old palms, insecure tenure, old age, poor road 
conditions, lack of smallholder confidence in the industry, and a 
view by some smallholders that replanting is unnecessary.  There is 
no doubt that for many growers replanting will result in financial 
hardship.  A significant disincentive to replanting is the short-term 
financial ‘double disadvantage’ it causes.  By this we mean 
smallholders are required to go into debt (replanting loan) at the 
same time as their capacity to repay loans is reduced through the loss 
of income from two hectares of poisoned palms.  Blocks that would 
be hardest hit financially during replanting are those with only old 
strands of oil palm, VOP producers with a single, two hectare stand, 
and part-time/semi-retired smallholders.  Multiple household blocks 
where oil palm income is already thinly spread amongst residents 
would also experience financial hardship during replanting. 
 
Further, for smallholders replanting is a risky strategy, particularly in 
the context of fluctuating commodity prices, and other uncertainties 
such as income loss through illness, social conflicts or irregular and 
unpredictable fruit pickups.  To overcome the short-term income 
risks and the financial ‘double disadvantage’ there is a need to 
introduce more flexible replanting options to meet the various needs 
and circumstances of smallholder households. 
 
To lessen the financial hardship of replanting and to maintain 
household economic security, supplementary income sources should 
also be encouraged.  In making this point we would argue that the 
promotion of supplementary income sources should not be limited to 
blocks undergoing replanting, but rather be an integral part of 
OPIC’s general extension strategies. 
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With population growth it is unlikely that diversification of income 
sources would disrupt or detract from oil palm production.  The 
reverse is likely to be the case for two reasons.  First, as noted 
throughout this report, livelihood diversification contributes to social 
stability and harmony amongst co-residents on a block.  Oil palm 
production is often disrupted when there is conflict between co-
residents.  Conflict, particularly on multiple household blocks, 
makes smallholders less likely to consider long-term investments in 
oil palm and more likely to seek ways to avoid loan deductions.  
Second, many recent agricultural studies in Third World countries 
(e.g., Evans and Ngau 1991; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2001; Rigg & 
Nattapoolwat 2001) have revealed that income diversification, 
especially off-farm income, is associated with agricultural 
innovation and greater levels of farm investment.  By reducing social 
conflict and lowering livelihood risks, income diversification, 
encourages and facilitates innovation and investment in farming.  
Diversification into non-oil palm income sources amongst 
smallholders is therefore not a threat to the industry; rather, it is an 
indicator of the successful maturation of the smallholder sector. 
 
Due to the large area requiring replanting at Bialla and the need to 
maintain the productivity and viability of the smallholder sector, 
replanting requires immediate attention.  While the company and 
OPIC are firmly committed to a replanting programme and are 
giving it high priority, there are insufficient RDB funds for the 
implementation of a full replanting programme.  Additional funding 
is required for replanting, and OPIC and the company should pursue 
this issue as a matter of urgency.  At the same time extension and 
industry strategies must be put in place to encourage smallholders to 
take up loan replanting packages.  With this in mind we present the 
following recommendations: 
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Recommendation: improve access to credit for replanting  
First, the RDB should relax its eligibility criteria for replanting 
loans, especially the requirement that a third phase of oil palm be in 
production before loan approval.  Also, as outlined above, third 
phase plantings are typically under-harvested and should therefore 
not be encouraged unless there is clear evidence that the area would 
be regularly harvested. 
 
Second, in the light of limited RDB funding, HOPL and OPIC 
should pursue suitable funding sources for replanting.  Possible 
sources include the company itself extending credit to smallholders 
for replanting, or seeking international assistance from the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank or AusAID.  If international 
assistance were the preferred option, then this might be best 
approached as an industry-wide initiative working through OPIC 
with other PNG oil palm companies which have large areas of 
smallholder palms requiring replanting (i.e., Popondetta and 
Hoskins). 
 
Third, in procuring credit from international organisations, such 
funding should be available to smallholders at concessional interest 
rates.  Smallholders are reluctant to take on debt, and interest 
charges are a deterrent to investment in replanting.  Therefore, if 
these loans were to be channelled through the RDB, for example, 
interest charges would need to be significantly lower than the 2002 
rate of 15%.  With interest-free loans, smallholders would be less 
inclined to postpone replanting for as long as possible. 
 
 
Recommendation:  develop a range of replanting options for 
smallholders to lessen the financial hardship of poisoning a full 
2ha.  
VOP producers with only two hectares of oil palm and some LSS 
smallholders be given the option of poisoning only one hectare of 
old palms.  Once this is back in production, the second hectare could 
be poisoned and replanted.  Other, related, replanting options should 
be explored by OPRA. 
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Recommendation: replanting package to include a Mobile Card 
on selected multiple household blocks. 
For some multiple household blocks undertaking replanting, it may 
be useful to provide a Mobile Card so that they can earn income by 
harvesting other blocks while they wait for their new palms to come 
into production.  The Card could become part of a ‘replanting 
package’ for blocks where severe financial pressure would result 
following palm poisoning. 
 
 
Recommendation: The Board of the Bialla Growers’ Fund 
investigate the benefits to growers of extending the fund to cover 
replanting costs. 
A longer-term option is for growers to accumulate savings in the 
years leading up to replanting, so that when replanting becomes 
necessary, sufficient funds have been set aside to pay all or a portion 
of the costs.  The Bialla Growers Fund which was established by 
OPIC in 2002 (Chapter 2) may provide a vehicle for such saving.  At 
present the fund’s priorities are tools and sexava treatment.  
However, OPIC, HOPL and some growers are considering extending 
the purview of the fund to fertiliser and replanting.  The current levy 
of K1/tonne would need to be raised and this would require the 
consent of growers.  The monthly contributions to the Growers’ 
Fund for replanting should be based on a 20 year repayment period, 
the productive life of oil palm.  In this way, monthly deductions 
would be minimal, and growers would be more likely to agree to this 
option.  For growers joining the scheme late (e.g., 10 years to 
replanting), over half the costs of replanting would be met (with 
interest accumulation) when replanting became due.  Thus replanting 
would be less of a financial burden on growers. 
 
 
Recommendation: promote non-oil palm supplementary income 
sources. 
Encourage smallholders to prepare for the loss of income during 
replanting by promoting diversification of income sources such as 
the cultivation of quick return high value market crops (e.g., chillies, 
bananas, tobacco, etc.) on their replanted area or the rear section of 
their blocks.  Further diversification should be encouraged by 
promoting small business development including small-scale 
businesses for the repair of wheelbarrows and tools.  The creation of 
a more secure economic (and thus social) environment in the 
smallholder sector will raise growers’ confidence in the industry and 
their own futures with a consequent rise in their propensity to  
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innovate and to adopt a long-term view of their investments in oil 
palm (e.g., replanting). 
 
 
Fertiliser A combination of factors explains the low rate of fertiliser use by 
Bialla smallholders.  First, some growers have little awareness of the 
agronomic benefits of fertiliser and many are unaware of the 
recommended rates and methods of application.  Second, growers’ 
negative experience with fertiliser delivery by HOPL in 1999 has 
adversely affected their propensity to purchase fertiliser.  As 
confidence in the company grows the issue of distrust will lessen, 
and smallholders’ overall commitment to oil palm production, 
including fertiliser use, will increase. 
 
Thirdly, some growers question the economic benefits of fertiliser.  
For a significant proportion of growers – those who regularly under-
harvest – income gains from fertiliser may be marginal or negative.  
For these growers the only visible impact of fertiliser application is 
the monthly loan deductions for fertiliser.  Many under-harvesters 
would not perceive an increase in production and income following 
applications of fertiliser.  While more research is required on the 
economics of fertiliser from a smallholder perspective, some 
recommendations can be made at this stage. 
 
Recommendation: OPIC and OPRA should encourage fertiliser 
purchases only amongst those growers who consistently harvest 
all or most of their crop. 
Growers who regularly under-harvest and are unlikely to raise their 
harvesting rate should not be encouraged or feel compelled to 
purchase fertiliser (increased debt levels from fertiliser purchases 
may further reduce their already low productivity levels).  Rather, 
extension advice should stress the importance of full harvesting for 
maximising the income gains from fertiliser.  We therefore 
recommend a reappraisal of fertiliser field days and extension advice 
to smallholders.  As discussed above, extension messages must 
- 112 - 
 
 
emphasise the income losses from under-harvesting, and educate 
growers on the relationships between harvesting rates, fertiliser use 
and smallholder income. 
 
Further, by promoting fertiliser use only amongst growers who fully 
harvest their blocks, the production and income differentials between 
full-harvesters and under-harvesters would widen through time.  
Thus, the impact of fertiliser on yields and income would become 
apparent to other growers, and fully harvested blocks would serve as 
demonstration blocks.  In this way, growers who regularly under-
harvest would come to see the income benefits of fertiliser when 
fertiliser application goes hand-in-hand with full harvesting. 
 
 
Recommendation: Where feasible, fertiliser application should 
be promoted on blocks where the Mobile Card is being used to 
raise harvesting rates.  
Fertiliser application should be encouraged on labour-short blocks 
(e.g., single household blocks and elderly growers without sons) 
where the Mobile Card is being used to raise harvesting rates.  The 
income benefits from fertiliser are more likely to be realised as the 




Poor block maintenance is a constraint on smallholder productivity 
at Bialla.  On the older subdivisions where poor block maintenance 
is associated with old and semi-abandoned stands of oil palm, it 
would be unrealistic to expect growers to invest labour in 
maintaining these stands.  However, because these stands are largely 
an unproductive asset for smallholders there is a risk that they can 
become a reservoir for sexava.  Replanting is therefore the only 
realistic option for old, unproductive stands.  Maintenance will 
improve with replanting, as growers are better able to realise 
potential production and incomes. 




While block maintenance would improve following implementation 
of most of the recommendations made so far, further improvements 
in standards of block maintenance are possible through women’s 
greater involvement in this work.  Despite the success of the Mama 
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Loose Fruit scheme in raising the proportion of loose fruit going to 
the mill, women’s participation in the industry could be increased 
further with some minor modification of the scheme.  Currently, 
Bialla ‘Loose Fruit Mamas’ are not permitted to place fruit bunches 
in the ‘mama’ nets.  At Hoskins, some bunches are allowed to be 
included in each mama net, and this has provided a mechanism for 
men to pay their wives and daughters for other kinds of work on the 
block.  Many Hoskins women now weed palm circles and maintain 
access paths, and are paid for this work in FFB.  If some FFB were 
permitted on the mama net (e.g. 5 bunches per net), this would 
provide a mechanism for the payment of female labour beyond loose 
fruit collection. 
 
Weeded palm circles and better access paths would not only lead to 
the evacuation of more loose fruit, but would improve the efficiency 
of harvesting labour in general, thus raising the harvesting rate of 
FFB. 
 
Recommendation: Up to five fruit bunches be permitted to be 
weighed on each mama net. 
 
 
Roads  A major constraint on smallholder productivity is the poor and 
deteriorating road infrastructure on the Bialla scheme.  While the 
company is making major efforts to improve the reliability of 
transport schedules for pickup of smallholder fruit, the poor road 
network (including bridges) will continue to undermine company 
efforts to improve this area of their operations.  With approximately 
200km of roads requiring complete reconstruction and over 500km 
in need of urgent repair, funding will have to be sourced externally. 
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Because road infrastructure is in urgent need of repair on the other 
oil palm schemes in PNG, particularly Hoskins and Oro, OPIC and 
the companies should coordinate their efforts to secure international 
assistance from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank or 
AusAID.  Such a request might best be part of an overall package 
that includes funds for replanting.  
 
Recommendation: OPIC, HOPL and the other oil palm 
companies in PNG seek international assistance for the 
upgrading of road infrastructure. 
 
 
As a final point to this report, it must be stressed the new 
management team of HOPL has made significant progress in 
repairing HOPL’s relationship with OPIC and smallholders.  From 
the mid 1990s until 2001 smallholder confidence in the industry was 
undermined by the delayed replanting programme, late and irregular 
pickups, fertiliser deliveries without growers’ consent, cases of over-
charging for fertiliser and the under-weighing of smallholder fruit by 
trucks contracted to the company.  The distrust of the company 
created by these actions sapped smallholder confidence in the oil 
palm industry and had a negative impact on smallholder productivity 
and willingness to invest. 
 
Smallholders are risk averse for good reason, and are reluctant to 
risk labour and capital where returns cannot be assured.  The new 
management team has already made considerable progress towards 
restoring smallholder confidence in the industry but it must be 
recognised that this is a difficult and time-consuming task for all 
involved.  Company commitment to the smallholder sector is 
perhaps most apparent to growers by the recent dramatic 
improvements in the reliability of fruit collection schedules. 
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Certainty of fruit pickup will encourage smallholders to commit 
more labour to oil palm.  In a period of high prices together with the 
recent increase in mill capacity, the smallholder response should be 
that much more rapid.  Further, as smallholder confidence in the 
reliability of fruit pickups increases, their trust in the company will 
grow, and they will be more likely to commit to long-term 
investments in their blocks.  The company is already well on the 
way to rebuilding smallholder confidence in the industry. 





1. In deciding harvesting strategies it is likely that growers take into 
account the height of palms.  So, for instance, if Phase 1 is difficult 
to harvest because it has tall palms and Phase 2 has shorter palms, 
then harvesting may commence in Phase 2 rather than in Phase 1. 
 
2. The recruitment of off-block labour on a multiple household block 
would likely exacerbate existing social tensions between co-
residents. 
 
3. It is unrealistic to recommend that markim mun blocks be 
encouraged to revert to wok bung strategies without also addressing 
the underlying issues that led to the adoption of markim mun 
strategies in the first place.  Such issues include conflicts over the 
distribution of the income, and population and economic pressures 
on the block. 
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Factors identified by OPIC officers to explain high and low production among Hoskins smallholders 
 HIGH PRODUCTION LOW PRODUCTION 
PHYSICAL FEATURES Good soils. 
Good terrain conditions and drainage. 
Poor soils. 
Poor terrain conditions and poor drainage. 
AGRONOMIC AND FARM 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
Regular harvesting 
More likely to harvest rear section of block. 
Regular and correct use of fertiliser. 
Well maintained tools regularly available for harvesting. 
Well maintained block. 
Introduction of the Badang to overcome labour shortages, irregular harvesting 
and terrain problems. 
 
Irregular harvesting. 
Low harvesting rate at rear of block. Harvesting rate decreases away from the 
road (i.e., strong edge-effect). 
Fertiliser use poor or irregular. 
Harvesting tools often unavailable for harvesting or broken and not repaired 
promptly. 
Poorly managed block. 
LABOUR CHARACTERISTICS Co-operation of all family members (wok bung) in production. 
Organised, hard-working family unit. 
Limited labour availability overcome by use of contract work (e.g., contract 
workers used to apply fertiliser and for block maintenance). 
Visitors provide additional labour for harvesting and block maintenance work. 
 
Elderly blockowner with limited labour supply. 
Limited labour availability unable to be overcome.  Usually the result of family 
conflict. 
Labour disorganised. 
Illness and poor health, but no support with block maintenance or harvesting. 
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD 
RELATIONS 
AND DECISION MAKING 
Family unity and cohesiveness.   Family conflict.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION All the family benefits from income earned on block.  All co-operate to harvest 
and maintain block. 
Reluctance to share income.  One person controls the money and thus little 
incentive for other family members to harvest. 
Too many visitors on the block wanting to share in the income. Can act as a 




 Good cash management. 
Community type distractions limited. 
Good time management.  Limited demands on their time from customary 
obligations. 
 
Community distractions which remove labour from oil palm production (e.g., 
funerals, local and community politics and customary obligations). 
Poor cash management. 
Spending money on beer often results in low block maintenance and less 
commitment to production 
 
TENURE SECURITY  Inheritance problems on the LSS acts as a disincentive as ownership uncertain. 
Land disputes, either with customary owners or within the family. 
ECONOMIC MOTIVATION Economic pressure to earn a high income (e.g., some households motivated by 
school fees, debt repayments, etc.  Once economic pressure is removed (e.g., 
payment of school fees) then the household can shift to lower production levels. 
Limited or no economic pressure to earn a high income (e.g., VOPs blocks).  
Less economic pressure to harvest as they have greater access to subsistence and 
alternative sources of income (e.g., cocoa). 
LEVEL OF INTEREST  Young people lack commitment to the industry, or pride in the block.  They are 
interested in money, but not interested in maintaining the block. 
Multiple block owners.  Several low producers are multiple block owners, 
especially on VOP. 
Lazy grower. 




Factors identified by OPIC officers to explain high and low production among Popondetta smallholders 
 HIGH PRODUCTION LOW PRODUCTION 
PHYSICAL FEATURES Favourable topography Poor topography. 
AGRONOMIC AND FARM 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
Regular harvesting. 
Owner harvests and maintains all the block. 
Adequate supply of tools. 
 
Irregular and partial harvesting. 
Only harvests and maintains front section of the block. 
Lack of tools. 
Old palms on block.  Grower tends to harvest only the younger and 
shorter palms. 
 
LABOUR CHARACTERISTICS Most family members involved with harvesting. Family members unwilling to provide labour due to family conflicts. 
Off-block employment – less labour for oil palm. 
 
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD RELATIONS 
AND DECISION MAKING 
Co-operation between family members.  Disputes rare. Disputes within family.  Mainly between brothers, between fathers 
and sons and sometimes between sons and step-fathers. 
 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION Fair distribution of income within family.  Unequal distribution of income acts as disincentive to family 
members to harvest. 
 
TIME AND CASH MANAGEMENT 
SKILLS 
Good cash management. 
Balanced social and community obligations. 
Poor cash management. 
Customary obligations takes time away from oil palm production. 
 
TENURE SECURITY  Land ownership disputes on VOP blocks.  Some blocks being 
reclaimed or compensation demands made. 
Insecurity of tenure of LSS blockowners acts as disincentive to 
production and improving living standards. 
 
ECONOMIC MOTIVATION Rely heavily on oil palm income and block to provide family 
sustenance.  No alternatives. 
Fall in oil palm prices has only limited impact on production. 
VOP smallholders have good access to garden land and other 
subsistence resources.  Do not need to rely heavily on oil palm. 
Fall in oil palm prices acts as disincentive.  Some stop harvesting and 
maintaining the block. 
 
LEVEL OF INTEREST Personal character.  Competitive and plans ahead. 
Readily listens to extension advice. 
 
Personal character.  Grower ‘lacks vision and initiative’.  Some 
growers resist change. 
Unwilling to listen to extension advice. 




- 122 - 
 
